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CHAPTER I:
INTRODUCTION
A. ADDRESSING THE ISSUE
In the last fifteen years, a penetrating and
irreversible revolution has occurred in the world'
s
financial markets. The globalization of financial markets
and institutions along with innovative investments
strategies are two of the hallmarks featuring this change.
Investors and managers can now use new instruments, such as
derivatives involving new strategies, for guarding against
the always omnipresent financial risks. Derivatives are
financial instruments whose returns are derived from other
assets or variables. Futures and options are among the best
known. Although derivative markets have been around in
different forms for centuries, their growth has accelerated
rapidly in the last ten years. Financial experts advocate
that thanks to these instruments, financial markets in the
United States and throughout the world are more efficient
which in turn contribute to economic welfare. During the
last decade, more complex, more sophisticated derivatives
were introduced and the last years disasters due to
1
2derivatives pepper the financial press. In October 1993,
for example, the Financial Times reported that the
Bundesbank warned that the growth of derivatives markets
could endanger the stability of the world financial
system 1 . The German Central bank argued that "the increase
in the use of options, futures and other complex derivative
instruments has led to an interlinking of the world'
s
financial markets that makes them more vulnerable to
crisis 2 ." On February 25-26, 1995, the oldest British
merchant bank Baring Brothers collapsed. A 28 year-old
employee based in Singapore, trading futures and options
contracts, had accumulated losses exceeding £860 million.
Baring's capital was £540 million. A rescue effort by the
Bank of England failed. Other banks would not lend to
Barings because with derivatives contracts still open the
full extent of Barings' losses could not be fixed. This
crisis, among many others, raises important issues
concerning the use and regulation of derivatives,
particularly in the futures and options markets. The
financial markets are growing in new directions. More
sophisticated, more complex, products are introduced
primarily to meet the individual financial needs of bank
customers. Derivatives become highly successful risk
management tools but the dramatic growth in the use of
derivatives has prompted expressions of concern from U.S.
3financial regulators and Congress. For the most part, the
concerns that have been raised have focused on the
difficulty of assessing the various risks associated with
derivative products. For example, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency must ensure that national banks
engaging in derivative transactions, either as dealers or
as end-users, have the ability to accurately assess the
risks associated with financial derivative activities and
have sound risk management systems. To what extent is the
regulatory framework sufficient to protect the financial
system? Are other safeguards needed? Is greater
coordination between regulators and regulated parties
needed? What are the implications of derivative actions for
deposit-taking institutions? These are the main issues that
I am addressing and analyzing in this thesis. The main
concern is that bank managers who make large bets on price
movements use private clients money. This is what
derivatives are all about. Therefore, the regulators must
ensure that banks that engage in derivative contracts have
the ability to accurately assess the risks associated with
these products and have sound risk management systems in
order to prevent insolvencies. The delicate task and, may
be dilemma, that regulators face is to allow innovation in
a safe and sound manner without smothering new activities
with superfluous burdensome restrictions. Bank Regulators
4have two main concerns about derivatives. The first is that
poor management or lack of understanding of these
complicated instruments could cause companies and banks to
incur heavy losses. For example, in late 1993, a trading
subsidiary of Metallgesellschaft, the German oil and metals
company, faced final losses of one billion on dealings in
the oil derivative markets 3 . The second concern is the
broader impact on other financial markets, particularly
whether derivatives have a destabilising influence.
Additionally, the regulators agree that the poor existing
regulation is outdated and possibly ineffective. New
regulation is needed.
B. SCOPE OF THE THESIS
While the thesis focuses on the analysis of the legal
aspects of the derivative instruments regulation, it is not
addressing and analyzing the economical and pure financial
aspects of these markets. Nevertheless, the reader will
notice the important implication of some technical jargon
which inevitably needs to be used for our purpose.
This thesis examines the legal issues involved in the
trade of derivatives. It centers primarily on the most
common derivative instruments such as futures and options
but there are, of course, numerous other financial products
5available and many other types of futures and options
exist. The thesis sketches and analyses the risks users
encounter in trading these products and the tools available
to governments and agencies to manage and reduce these
risks in the United States.
C. ORGANIZATION
Chapter I provides a general introduction to the
subject and describes the reasons why derivatives are
considered to be a hot topic. Chapter II presents a brief
statement of the basic concepts of banking regulation in
the United States and summarizes the role played by the
different regulatory agencies. Chapter III then turns to
the analysis of the origin, growth of derivative markets
and informs the reader about the integration and
globalization of financial markets. Chapter IV deals with
the definition and examination of futures and options, two
of the most common derivative products used in the
financial markets. It further discusses and illustrates
their functioning and establishes the rational principles
that should be mastered to understand the dynamics
associated with derivatives and the way they work. Chapter
V covers the study and examination of the omnipresent risks
associated with the use of derivatives. Chapter VI focuses
on recent litigation cases and analyzes the existing
regulation. It then highlights the needs for more
regulatory actions.
Chapter VII explores the U.S. bank supervisory
initiatives and proposed regulation of banks' derivative
activities by the regulatory agencies and the Self-
Regulatory Organizations. Chapter VIII surveys the latest
federal legislative initiatives for the supervision and
regulation of derivatives of banks and is followed by my
final comments and conclusions.
CHAPTER II:
BANKING REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES -
BASIC FEATURES
A. RATIONALES FOR BANKING REGULATION
Banks are among the most regulated industries of all,
not only in the United States but worldwide. Over the years
a blend of customs, understandings, administrative practice
and formal law has given rise to an affluence of rules that
bind and govern banks as well as the regulatory agencies
charged with their oversight. The goals that must be
achieved by a regulatory system for the financial services
industry are efficiency of regulation, flexibility, fair
dealing, safety and soundness, avoidance of concentration,
and efficient implementation of monetary policy 4 .
Efficiency of regulation is achieved when financial
regulators and regulations distort the behavior of market
participants only to the extent required to achieve valid
public policy goals 5 . Flexibility in regulation is the
ability of a regulatory system to adapt to changes in the
regulated industry without distorting the regulatory
8system, the industry, or the marketplace generally6 . The
lack of flexibility is one of the major problems in
financial regulation today. From the perspective of
financial institutions, safety and soundness considerations
mean that a regulatory system should prevent institutional
failures when harm to the financial marketplace would
result 7 . This type of regulation is intended to prevent
banks from failing through controlling risks and ensuring
adequate capital 8 . Preventing failure avoids deposit-
insurance pay-outs and systemic risk (i.e., a chain
reaction of bank failures through interbank deposit linkage
or payment settlement systems 9 ) . In theory, that goal is
achieved by protecting small depositors with deposit
insurance. In practice, however, large banks have become so
dependent upon uninsured deposits that the "confidence" of
the uninsured, institutional investor has provided the link
between deposits at an individual bank and the stability of
the financial system as a whole 10 . The banking regulators
and lawmakers have always been concerned by concentration
of financial power, possible conflicts of interest and the
appropriate scope of risks banks could incur. Banks are in
someway special and should therefore be distinguished from
other financial or nonfinancial institutions. Why are they
special? These financial firms have a special role to play
in a modern economy. Financial institutions help households
9and firms to save; they also facilitate the complex
payments among many elements of the economy and in the case
of commercial banks they serve as conduits for the
government's monetary policy11 . More specifically they are
special for three reasons. First, because they offer
transaction accounts 12 . The liquidity, the mobility and
acceptability of the these accounts permit our economic and
financial system to work with relative ease and
efficiency13 . On the other hand, banks can also create,
through their lending activities, transaction deposits 14 .
Banks are indeed, the primary source of liquidity for
all others classes and sizes of institutions, both
financial and nonfinancial. Finally, banks are the
transmission belt for the monetary policy15 . The fact that
banks are subject to reserve requirements place the banking
system in the unique position of being the transmission
belt through which the actions and policies of the central
bank have their effect on financial market conditions 16 .
These are the main reasons why banks have been strictly
regulated.
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B. DUAL BANKING SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES - BANK
RUNS AND SYSTEMIC RISK
1. The Dual Banking System
Ever since the Civil war, the American banking
industry has operated under a system of overlapping state
and federal regulation 17 . The dual banking system comes out
of a federalist tradition: unwillingness to concentrate too
much power in the national government 18 . Under this system,
a bank is chartered, examined and regulated as either a
national bank, under the National Bank Act 19 or as a state
chartered bank under any one of the fifty-two different
state banking laws 20 . A bank that obtains a state charter
is referred to as a state bank while a bank that obtains a
federal charter is known as a national bank. By selecting
one chartering authority rather than another, banks can
determine the nature of the regulations to which they will
be subject as well as the identity of the government agency
that exercises the regulatory function.
2. Bank Runs and Systemic Risk
The principle of fractional reserves states that banks
will never have more than a small portion of depositors'
funds on hand in the form of cash21 . As a result, if a run
starts and many depositors demand withdrawal, the bank will
11
not be able to satisfy its customers. The bank's depositors
have the right to withdraw on demand. If they hear rumors,
they can take their funds out in a matter of minutes 22 . For
example, speculation in the security business during the
1920s by banks and their affiliates resulted in tremendous
losses when the securities markets soured. These losses
undermined depositor confidence and caused a rash of bank
runs, which led in turn to many bank insolvencies and an
unstable money supply. Bank runs and panics are frightening
events and today when they occur it is largely in the form
of electronic or mail withdrawals placed from remote
locations rather than by means of panicky mobs 23 . However,
bank runs and panics are rare today thanks to federal
deposit insurance which covers accounts at insured banks up
to $100,000 per depositor per institution24 . A bank run is
in no one's best interest. Even if the bank has become
insolvent, everyone would be better off if closure occurred
through an orderly process in which the bank could maximize
the value of its assets rather than selling them at "fire
sale" prices in order to satisfy depositor demands 25 . In
considering bank runs and panics, it is necessary to
distinguish commercial banks and open-end mutual funds.
These two institutions might be involved in the derivative
markets but mutual funds are not subject to runs in the
same way as banks are. Indeed, the liabilities of open-end
12
funds are in the form of demand equity rather than demand
debt 26 . Because the fund pays out investors based on net
asset value, there is virtually no chance that the fund
will become economically insolvent as a result of investor
withdrawals 27 . It remains theoretically possible that an
open-end fund would suffer a temporary or "liquidity"
insolvency if depositors demanded withdrawal more quickly
than the fund could liquidate its assets to pay them28 .
This possibility, however, is virtually eliminated by the
fact that the assets of an open-end fund are typically
devoted almost entirely to short-term securities with ready
markets 29 and these assets can be converted to cash in a
matter of hours. For these reasons, runs on open-end funds
are virtually nonexistent despite the fact that they do not
carry federal deposit insurance. More frequent and more
frightening on a greater scale than bank runs is Systemic
risk. Systemic risk is the risk that the failure of one
bank will lead to the failure of other banks 30 . Even with
the best supervisory control system, a chain reaction can
result from the linkage of interbank deposits 31 . One bank
can hold sizable deposits of other banks and if that bank
fails, the other banks could fail as well. Another chain
reaction can arise through payment system linkage 32 . If one
bank fails to settle its position in a net settlement
system for large value payments (for example, the Clearing
13
House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) in the United
States) other banks, which do not get paid, may in turn
fail. Finally, a chain reaction can happen through
imitative runs 33 . When one bank fails, depositors in other
banks may assume that their banks may also fail and so
withdraw their funds, exposing these banks to a liquidity
crisis and ultimately to failure. We now turn away from the
industry itself to look briefly to its regulators.
C. BANK REGULATORY AGENCIES
Made possible largely by new technology, the
integration of financial markets and services has broadened
the scope of the financial industry. But globalization and
integration raise important legal issues relating both to
the regulatory and supervisory function of governments and
to the mutual rights and obligations of the participating
parties. It also emphasizes, in this context of
transnational activities, the need for uniform rules and
for internationally accepted methods for the application of
those rules and the settlement of disputes. These
developments and their inevitable conflicting undertones
have strongly influenced the actions of public institutions
interested in the banking industry in each country. The
diversity of such institutions within the same national
14
jurisdiction is not to be underestimated. In the United
States alone the wide range of regulators demanding the
attention of banks includes the Federal Reserve, the US
Treasury, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Department
of Labor, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
,
the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC)
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) , the state bank
supervisors, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
,
the state Securities Commissioners, the state insurance
departments, and the Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs)
such as the stock, options and commodity exchanges, and the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) 34 .
In addition to national authorities, international
institutions and groups are deeply concerned with the
regulation of international banking. These include, in
addition to the Bretton Woods Institutions, the Bank of
International Settlements, its standing Committee on Bank
Regulations and Supervisory Practices (the Basle
Committee) , the Contact Group of the European Economic
Community, the Institute for International Finance and a
host of regional and subregional supervisory groups 35 .
With so many agencies and different statutes it is no
wonder that disparities in regulation exist. While the
scope of this thesis does not include the analysis of all
the regulatory agencies and their disparities, it will
15
highlight and examine those who play an important role in
the regulation of derivative activities. In this regard,
the primary federal commercial bank regulators are the
Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
1. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System
Under the Federal Reserve Act 36 , Congress empowered
the Federal Reserve Board to manage the nation' s money
supply and to supervise State Banks which are members of
the federal reserve system37 , National Banks, and bank
holding companies 38 . State Members banks are subject to
examination by both federal and state bank examiners 39 .
2. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
National Banks are chartered 40 , examined41 and
regulated42 by the Comptroller of the Currency. A National
Bank must obtain the express consent of the OCC before it
may engage in activities not expressly provided for in
either statute or regulation 43 . State banks are regulated
by their respective state agencies. Each of the fifty
states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, has its
own particular banking act providing for the authorization,
16
chartering, regulation, and examination of its State
Banks 44 .
3. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
The FDIC exercises residential supervisory authority
over National Banks and State Member Banks 45 . The FDIC also
directs supervisory authority over State Banks which elect
to obtain federal deposit insurance, even if they are not
members of the Federal Reserve System ("State Nonmember
Banks'') 46 . The FDIC has claimed the authority to regulate
the scope of powers that a State Nonmember Bank may
exercise under section 6 of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act 47 . Section 6 requires the FDIC to determine, before
approving deposit insurance, "whether or not the applying
bank' s corporate powers are consistent with the purpose of
the FDIC Act." 48 The FDIC is also able to exercise
regulatory authority over State Banks for which it ensures
deposits ("Insured State Banks'') by virtue of its power to
terminate deposit insurance 49 . Justifications for the FDIC
terminating deposit insurance may include, for example,
determining that the bank has engaged in unsafe or unsound
practices 50 . Finally, the FDIC handles failures of insured
institutions and has authority to act as conservator of
institutions that are in danger of default and as receiver
of failed institutions 51 .
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4. State Regulators
State-chartered banks, savings and loans, savings
banks are supervised and regulated by a variety of state
agencies 52 .
5. Complexi ty of the System
National banks are regulated by the Comptroller of the
Currency and state banks are regulated by their respective
state agency. Banks that are members of the Federal Reserve
are regulated by the Federal Reserve. Banks that are
insured by the FDIC are also regulated by the FDIC. Because
all national banks must be members of the Federal Reserve
and all Federal Reserve member banks must hold FDIC
insurance, national banks are regulated by the Comptroller,
the Federal Reserve and FDIC. State banks are regulated by
their respective state agency, the Federal Reserve if they
are members of the Federal Reserve and the FDIC if they
carry insurance from FDIC. The development of the dual
banking system has created a banking regulatory scheme that
is not only complex but is also non-uniform between
National and State Banks.
18
D. BANKING AND SECURITIES ACTIVITIES: THE GLASS-
STEAGALL ACT
1. The Glass -Steaaall Wall
Responding to political charges that the Depression of
1933 had been caused by bank speculation in securities, the
Glass-Steagall Act separated commercial banking from
investment banking. The separation of investment banking
activities from commercial banking activities fosters
public confidence in the banking system because it protects
banks against the risks inherent in the securities
business 53 . Securities firms were not allowed to accept
deposits or affiliate with deposit-taking institutions and
commercial bank members of the Federal Reserveeral Reserve
System were barred from participating, either directly or
indirectly, in many aspects of the securities business.
Banks have limited securities powers. They can only
underwrite government debt, but they can be involved in
brokerage activities 54 . Banking affiliates- non bank
subsidiaries of Bank Holding Companies- can do more. They
can underwrite corporate debt and equity securities through
so called § 32 20 subsidiaries, so long as they are not
"engaged principally" (more than 10% of Gross Revenue) in
these activities 55 . The separation of securities activities
from banking activities is justified by the potential
19
conflicts of interest that could result 56 . For example, if
a bank was allowed to underwrite securities, it could
advise its corporate customers to purchase these securities
and could threaten to cut off future loans if the customers
did not oblige 57 .
2. The Breakdown of the Glass-Steaaall Wall
The separation wall between investment and commercial
banking is crumbling and is about to fall. Competition and
market forces pushed nonbanks to invade the commercial
banking field by offering money market funds with checking
privileges 58 . Securities firms also invaded the banking
market of making commercial loans by means of commercial
paper market 59 . Banks have counterattacked by invading the
securities business. They now serve as investment advisors
to mutual funds, act as stock brokers and compete with
securities firms in the market for placing commercial paper
with buyers 60 . Even more significantly, securities
subsidiaries of bank holding companies have been allowed to
engage in the full range of traditional securities
activities, including the underwriting of corporate debt
and equity issues 61 . Furthermore, there have been
discussions and debates in Congress to repeal the Glass
Steagall Act. U.S. House Banking Committee Chairman Jim
Leach introduced the Financial Services Competitiveness Act
20
of 1995 in the Congress that would repeal Section 20 of the
Glass-Steagall Act and would create a new Section of the
Bank Holding Company Act to authorize an adequately
capitalized bank holding company to own a securities
affiliate engaged in the dealing and underwriting of
securities 62 . It would also permit a securities firm to
acquire banks by becoming a bank holding company or to
become an "investment bank holding company" (IBHC) and to
acquire a "wholesale financial institution", an institution
taking uninsured deposits of $100,000 or more 63 .
E. CAPITAL ADEQUACY REGULATION
The efficient performing of financial markets requires
that members of the financial community have confidence in
each other's ability to transact business. This premise
means that each member of the financial community must
have, among other things, adequate capital. In general,
capital standards are designed to protect customers and to
ensure a viable financial system by diminishing the chance
of a series of interrelated defaults because of risks in
securities markets 64 . The purpose of capital adequacy rules
is to protect against excessive riskiness in banking 65 . A
bank's capital - that is roughly speaking the excess of its
assets over its liabilities - is its cushion against
21
insolvency66 . Capital adequacy regulation requires that
banks maintain sufficient levels of capital against their
assets. There are a variety of bases for mandating minimum
capital. First, capital may be utilized to provide a
cushion against future losses 67 . Further, the greater a
bank's equity, the smaller the cost to the FDIC in a
liquidation proceeding 68 . Also, minimum capital
requirements may be used to curb potentially risky or
unprofitable interstate and product expansion 69 . There are
currently two separate capital adequacy rules for banks:
-1. Leverage ratios : this is simply a gross ratio of
capital to assets without any adjustment for risk 70 . It
does not take into account the Risk Profile of the bank.
For example, Capital/assets equals 3% for high rated
institutions and with higher ratios for lower rated
institutions 71 . This method became problematic because of
international competition.
-2. Risk adjusted capital ratios that stems from the Basle
Agreement in 1988 72 . The underlying rationale behind the
use of a risk-based capital approach is based on a system
assigning assets and off-balance sheet items, such as
derivatives, to risk categories. The Capital Adequacy rules
establish minimum ratios of capital to weighted risk
assets, but banks and bank holding companies are generally
expected to operate well above the minimum risk-based
22
ratios at a level corresponding to the degree of risk to
which they are exposed73 . Banks must hold capital against
counterparty credit risks exposures, including the credit
risk exposure from their derivative activities. In light of
these considerations the banking regulatory agencies expect
that banking organizations will, as a general matter,
operate with capital levels well above the minimum risk-
based levels 74 .
F. THE SUPERVISORY SYSTEM - ENFORCEMENT ACTION
Banking institutions are among the most closely
scrutinized businesses in the United States 75 . In order to
prevent banks from engaging in illegal behavior or unsound
practices and to maintain public confidence in the
integrity of the banking system, banks are subjected to
vigorous and ever-increasing regulatory review76 . Federal
Reserve bank regulators have access to a broad range of
sanctions. Banks are required to report massive amounts of
information to their respective supervisory agencies. They
must disclose the results of their operations, the shape of
their balance sheets, the general makeup of their assets,
their capital structure and much more 77 . The most intimate
details of their operations are subject to probing analysis
by bank examiners whose sole responsibility is to detect
23
illegality and unsafe practices 78 . If the regulators become
convinced that an institution is engaged in illegal
behavior or unsound practices, they may threaten a cease-
and-desist action against the institution or its officers
and directors 79 . The officers and directors may be sued for
civil damages and they may even be removed - fired - from
the institution and barred from all federally insured
institutions 80 . For example, an agency may issue an order
against a bank officer who has violated any law, regulation
or order, participated in "unsafe or unsound practice," or
breached a fiduciary duty, and, as a result of any such
actions, has caused or may cause an institution to suffer a
financial loss, may prejudice the interest of depositors,
or has realized a pecuniary gain81 . The institution itself
may suffer onerous penalties, including suspension or
termination of Federal Reserve deposit insurance 82 . The
most important enforcement procedures are: informal
agreements and conditions; cease-and-desist orders;
suspension or removal of bank officers; civil monetary
penalties; suspension or termination of Federal Reserve
deposit insurance; civil litigation and criminal
prosecutions 83 . As a general rule, courts defer to the
enforcement actions of Federal Reserve banking agencies 84 .
The agencies enjoy very broad powers to impose sanctions.
The examination process can help prevent problem situations
24
from remaining uncorrected and deteriorating to the point
where costly financial assistance by the FDIC becomes
unavoidable 85 . Also, the examination supplies the
supervisor with an understanding of the nature, relative
seriousness and ultimate cause of bank's problems, and thus
provides a factual foundation to soundly base correctives
measures, recommendations and instructions 86 . One would
suspect that given these impressive powers, the supervision
system would be remarkably effective at preventing unsound
practices. As will be noted in the next chapters, the
staggering losses incurred by the banking industry during
the last five years due to the use of derivatives could
probably have been avoided in every instance had the
institution in question been prevented from further trading
in those volatile products or been required to stop trading
these instruments prior to or to the point of economic
insolvency. Why does the system not work as it should? What
accounts for the apparent regulatory inefficiency? First,
it may well be that bank examiners do not possess a fully
adequate methodology for assessing the safety and soundness
of the financial institutions they supervise 87 , especially
those heavily engaged in derivatives trade. Furthermore,
bank examinations may have become less effective as a
result of profound structural changes in the banking and
finance industry88 . As some institutions have become
25
nationwide and even worldwide in scope, conducting broad
range of complex activities such as derivatives, it is
getting more difficult for the agencies to reveal a full
and accurate picture of the institution's overall financial
status 89 . It is virtually impossible to conduct a reliable
audit at the bank from a single location and by the time
you have gathered all relevant information in order to
assess the institution' s current condition and make
judgments about compliances, it might be that the
information is already outdated or at least does not
reflect accurately the financial status of the institution.
Even consolidation records of a bank cannot be fully up to
date because derivative positions change all the time and
balance sheets do not give a proper picture of what is
going on. For anyone on the outside to keep track is
virtually impossible. Additionally, it is even more
difficult to monitor and supervise an industry in crisis.
CHAPTER III:
DEFINITION -
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS
A. THE DEFINITION OF DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS
1. Introduction
It might be worthwhile to introduce this subchapter by
giving first an illustration of one kind of investment
strategy that characterize the dynamics associated with
some kind of derivative instruments. Let us take the
property owner with a mortgage as an example. A person buys
a house for $100,000; he or she puts up $10,000 and borrows
$90,000 from the bank. He or she has no intention to live
in that house nor would he or she be the owner. His or her
intention is to sell the house at the most appropriate
time. Six months later, the house is sold for $150,000. He
or she pays back $90,000 to the bank (for our purpose we
ignore interest payments) and keeps $60,000 which seems not
too bad for an original investment of just $10,000. As will
be noted in the course of subsequent chapters, the
principle is exactly the same in many derivative
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investments: leverage or the use of debt to magnify
investement returns.
2. Definition : What Are Derivatives?
The usual textbook definition given for derivatives is
something like "instruments derived from securities or
physical markets." 90 The problem is that the term
"derivatives'7 has become a catch-all generic term that has
been used to include all types of new (and some old)
financial instruments. The most common types of derivatives
that investors are likely to come across are futures,
options, forwards, swaps, warrants and convertible bonds.
Beyond this, the derivative range is only limited by
the imagination of investment bankers and it is likely that
any person who has funds invested or placed in an insurance
policy or pension fund, is already, wittingly or
unwittingly, involved in derivative activities 91 . More
specifically, financial derivatives are defined as
"financial instruments which derive their value from the
performance of assets, interest or currency exchange rates,
or indexes." 92 Derivative transactions include a wide
assortment of financial contracts, including structured
debt obligations, deposits, swaps, futures, options, caps,
floors, collars, forwards, and various combinations
thereof." 93 They are widely used to speculate on future
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expectations or to reduce a security portfolio's risk.
Despite the variety and complexity of these instruments,
all derivatives basically require two parties to take
opposite positions as to the future value of the underlying
asset. One party to the contract assumes the risk that the
underlying asset will increase in value while the other
party assumes the risk of a decrease in value. The
underlying asset can be anything from stocks to interest
rates 94 . There are also derivative instruments involving
commodities and precious metals and the range of terms and
conditions attached to derivative contracts are as broad as
the imagination of the contracting parties. Finally,
derivatives should not be confused with shares. The subtle,
but crucial, difference lies in the fact that, while shares
are assets, derivatives are usually contracts (the major
exception to this are warrants and convertible bonds, which
are similar to shares in that they are assets) . Financial
assets (e.g. shares, bonds) can be defined as claims on
another person or corporation; they will usually be fairly
standardized and governed by the property or securities
laws in an given jurisdiction. On the other hand, a
contract is merely an agreement between two parties, where
the contract details may not be standardized. Possibly
because it is thought that investors may be wary of the
woolly definition of derivatives, one frequently comes
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across references to "derivatives securities" "derivatives
products". These "securities" and "products" sound fairly
solid, tangible things. But in many cases these terms are
rather inappropriately applied to what are really
contracts.
B. ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF DERIVATIVES
1. The Development of Derivative Markets
The derivative markets have a long pedigree.
Historians have traced transactions in derivative
instruments to 2000 B.C. 95 In the U.S., is was not until
the middle of the eighteenth century that a fully
functioning futures market was established in Chicago 96 .
Chicago was rapidly becoming the transportation and
distribution center of the Midwest. Farmers shipped their
grain from the farm belt to Chicago for sale and subsequent
distribution eastward along rail lines and the Great
Lakes 97 . However, due to the seasonal nature of grain
production, large quantities of grain were shipped to
Chicago in the later summer and fall 98 . The city's storage
facilities were inadequate for accommodating this temporary
increase in supply. Prices fell drastically at harvest time
as supplies increased and then, rose steadily as supplies
were consumed 99 . In 1848, a group of businessmen took the
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first step toward alleviating this problem by forming the
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) 100 . The CBOT initially was
organized for the purpose of standardizing the quantities
and qualities of the grains 101 .
A few years later, the first forward contract was
developed. Called a "to-arrive" contract, it provided that
a farmer could agree to deliver the grain at a future date
at a price determined in advance 102 . This meant that the
farmer would not ship the grain to Chicago at harvest time
but could fix the price and date at which the grain
subsequently would be sold103 . Speculators soon found that
rather than buy and sell the grain itself they could buy
and sell the contracts 104 . In that way, they could speculate
on the price of grain to be delivered at a future date and
not have to worry about taking delivery of and storing the
grain 105 . Soon thereafter, the exchange established a set of
rules and regulations for governing these transactions. In
1874, the Chicago Produce Exchange was formed and in 1898
it was reorganized as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange,
which is now the world's second largest futures exchange 106 .
One of the America's first financial scandals, involved
futures trading in securities 107 . William Duer, a prominent
financier and Revolutionary War figure, was bankrupted in
1792 after he engaged in massive speculations in the debt
of the United States and stock of the Bank of the United
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States and the Bank of New York 108 . He and an accomplice,
Alexander Macomb, entered into contracts for the future
delivery of those securities, which triggered a speculative
frenzy109 . The speculation eventually failed, resulting in
America's first financial panic 110 . Trading in "privileges",
"puts and calls", and "price differences" also accompanied
the speculation during the Civil war 111 . For a fee, the
purchaser was given the "privilege" or option to buy or
sell grain a a specified price 112 . In 1865, the Board of
Trade prohibited such transactions because they were viewed
to be gambling contracts but that bar was ineffective in
stopping such trading as were later the efforts of the
exchange 113 . Difference trading on price changes also became
commonplace in the over-the-counter market and again the
states attempted to stop this trading through legislation
that prohibited such contracts or made them unenforceable
as gambling contracts 114 . The Commodity Exchange Act of 1936
prohibited domestic futures transactions that did not take
place on a licensed contract market such as the Chicago
Board of Trade 115 . By the early 1970s, however, there were
numerous unregulated exchanges that were trading futures
contracts on several commodities including precious metals,
currencies, and the so-called "world" commodities, e.g.,
coffee, sugar, and cocoa 116 . Another more serious flaw in
the Commodity Exchange Act involved its prohibition against
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commodity options trading, which had been banned because of
the many abuses associated with those instruments 117 . The
same gap in the Commodity Exchange Act that allowed some
futures exchanges to operate in an unregulated environment
also allowed options trading on such commdities leading to
millions of dollars in customer losses 118 . Congress reacted
to these problems by enacting new legislation, the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act 119 (CFTCA) of 1974,
which created a commission similar to the Securities and
Exchange Commission and this commission was given expanded
regulatory powers and enforcement sanctions 120 . The new act
subjected all commodities of whatever kind to regulation
under the Commodity Exchange Act 121 . The new Commission, the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) , was also given
plenary authority to regulate commodity options 122 . Before
the 1980s, generally speaking, bank uses of derivatives
were expected to be limited to the management of interest
rate and exchange rate risks associated with banking
operations, and were limited to instruments where the
underlying asset was an asset that was permissible for
direct purchase by the depository-institution123 . During the
course of the 1980s, however, the nature and extent of
financial institution participation in the derivative
markets changed dramatically. Banks became increasingly
involved in trading activities that were not necessarily
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related to the management of risk, and expanded the
purchase and sale of products to include instruments where
the underlying asset was not necessarily one that the
financial institution could buy or sell 124 . In addition, the
explosive growth of the swap markets contributed
significantly to bank involvement in the OTC derivative
markets, as financial institutions discovered that their
ability to control interest rate, exchange rate and other
risks associated with their general banking activities was
significantly enhanced by the ability to exchange (or swap)
cash flows and payment streams 125 . As more new derivative
products, such as swaps and certain interest rate
contracts, began to multiply, at the same time, confusion
grew as to whether this new products had to be regulated by
the CFTC. Recognizing the uncertainty that lay in the area
of these developing derivative financial instruments,
Congress enacted the Futures Trading Practices Act of
1992 126 . That legislation amended the Commodity Exchange Act
to provide the CFTC with some exemptive power for
institutional traders 127 . This was needed, not only to
remove the legal uncertainties of swaps and over-the-
counter derivatives, but also because the derivative
products traded by institutions were individually
negotiated and would not fit within the standardized format
required for exchange trading 128 . The Futures Trading
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Practices Act of 1992 allowed the CFTC to exempt any
transaction by "appropriate persons" from the exchange
trading requirement 129 . Appropriate persons include
institutional participants such as banks, insurance
companies, investment companies, commodity pools, broker-
dealers, corporations of a specific size and "other
persons." 130 . The CFTC has adopted regulations to implement
that legislation by, among other things, exempting swaps
transactions by institutions 131 .
2. The Development of Financial Futures
For the first 120 years, futures exchanges offered
trading in contracts on commodities such as agricultural
goods and metals 132 . Then, in 1971, the major Western
economies began to allow their currency exchanges rates to
fluctuate and this opened the way for the formation in 1972
of the International Monetary Market (IMM) , a subsidiary of
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange that specializes in the
trading of futures contracts on foreign currencies 133 . These
were the first futures contracts that could be called
financial futures 134 . In 1976, the International Monetary
Market introduced the first futures contract on a
government security and short-term financial instrument:
the 90 day U.S. Treasury bills 135 . This contract was
actively traded for many years, but its popularity has
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declined somewhat, at least partly due to the remarkable
success of a competing contract, the Eurodollar futures,
which was launched in 1981 136 . In 1977, the Chicago Board of
Trade started what became the most successful contract of
all time: the U.S. Treasury bond futures 137 . The 1980s
brought the highly successful stock index futures
contract 138 . The ensuing years saw a tremendous degree of
competition between the futures exchanges to introduce new
contracts that would generate significant trading volume 139 .
Barely a month passed without at least one new futures
contract being introduced 140 . Today financial futures and
options markets span over the globe. The underlying asset
may be a deposit in a major currency, a bond issued by a
major government, equity in a firm or an index in a leading
stock.
3. The Growth of Derivative Markets and The
Integration of Financial Markets
An important phenomenon of recent years has been the
tremendous growth in international markets 141 . Fueled by
advances in communications technology and the breakdown of
communism, we have seen economic systems change and new
financial markets develop in nearly all countries of the
world 142 . Indeed, Eastern Europe develops its market
economies, Western Europe moves toward a unified economic
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system and Japan already represents an enormous economic
and financial power. The continued growth of large
multinational corporations and financial institutions, has
brought down barriers among countries, making it much
easier to trade financial assets across country lines 143 .
This phenomenon whereby markets in various countries
behave in a competitive and unified manner is called
international market integration 144 or the globalization of
financial markets. Three factors have led to this
integration. First, the deregulation of markets in key
financial centers of the world has played an important
role 145 . Global competition has forced governments to
deregulate various aspects of their financial markets so
that their financial enterprises can compete effectively
around the world146 . Second, technological advances for
monitoring world markets, executing orders and analyzing
financial opportunities have brought radical changes in the
financial markets 147 .
Advances in telecommunications systems, such as
Internet or America Online, link market participants
throughout the world with the result that an order can be
executed within seconds. Further, advances in computer
technology along with advanced telecomunication networks
allow the transmission of real-time information on security
prices and other key information to many participants in
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many places 146 . As a result, many investors can monitor
global markets and simultaneously assess how this
information will effect the risk/return profile of their
portfolios 149 .
Third, the US financial markets have shifted from
domination by retail investors to domination by financial
institutions 150 . The shifting from dominance by retail
investors to institutional investors is referred to as the
institutionalization of financial markets 151 . Retail
investors mean individuals. For example, when you and I buy
a share of common stock, we are retail investors. Examples
of financial institutions are pension funds, insurances
companies, commercial banks, savings and loans
associations. As a result, unlike the retail investor,
institutional investors have been more willing to transfer
funds across national borders to improve portfolio
diversification and/or take advantage of perceived
mispricing of financial assets in foreign countries 152 . This
new environment creates challenges and opportunities for
today' s financial and investment managers but also entails
new threats. As will be examined in next chapters, this
integration of markets involves enhanced risk, especially
the so-called systemic risk (see infra) . Indeed, there has
been a fear expressed by certain regulators and
commentators that the failure of a major derivatives
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participant could send shock waves throughout the financial
system as a whole. This is referred to as the "ripple
effect". This new threat of single systemic risk has been
raised by some like a banner in the battle for more laws
and more regulation. Anyway, thanks to the dismantling of
regulatory barriers and improvement in the infrastructure
of financial markets, investors have gained access to a
wider range of products 153 . Derivatives have heightened that
trend. Because transaction costs are lower and derivatives
are often more actively traded than conventional
instruments, it is easier for example, to switch from
German to the Japanese stock market by using futures rather
then by selling a portfolio of individual stocks 154 .
Derivatives have created much greater linkage between
markets and the leverage involved means that positions can
turn much quicker 155 . For in the last ten years, the ties
that have been binding the financial world closer together
have themselves become more complex. For example, futures
trading takes place on 11 futures exchanges in the United
States and on an electronic system called GLOBEX 156 . Today,
almost every large country (and even a few small ones 157 )
has a futures exchange. One benefit of such global futures
trading, particularly when it is fully automated, is the
potential it offers for linkages among exchanges 158 . For
example, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the Singapore
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International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX) are linked so that
a trader opening a position in Eurodollars or certain
foreign currencies on one exchange can close the position
on the other 159 . The trading of futures on foreign products
and the opportunities to open a contract in one market and
offset it in another move the markets toward near 24-hour
trading 160 . Derivative instruments play and will continue to
play a critical role in global financial markets. The
unprecedented expansion in the use of derivatives can be
seen as the business world' s response to the financial
risks posed by increasingly globalized financial markets 161 .
Without derivative instruments and the markets in which
they trade, the financial systems throughout the world
would not be as integrated as they are today 162 .
CHAPTER IV:
WHO USES DERIVATIVES AND WHY -
THE PURPOSE AND ROLE OF DERIVATIVES
A. PARTICIPANTS IN DERIVATIVES
The participants in derivatives can be divided into
two groups: end-users and dealers. End-users are firms
engaged primarily in industrial or commercial enterprises
(for example, investment management firms, energy concerns,
export/import companies, corporations, governmental
entities, institutional investors, and financial
institutions 163 . Dealers consist mainly of banks and
securities firms with a few insurances companies and highly
rated corporations (mainly energy firms) having recently
joined the ranks 164 . An institution may participate in
derivatives activity both as an end-user and a dealer. For
example, a money-center bank acts as an end-user when it
uses derivatives to take positions as part of its
proprietary trading or for hedging as part of its asset and
liability management 165 . It acts as a dealer when it quotes
bids and offers and commits capital to satisfying
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customers' demands for derivatives 166 . Banks earn revenues
from derivative activities through "transaction fees, bid-
offer spreads, and their own trading positions." 167 Banks
may also earn fees by offering customers risk management
tools through the use of financial derivatives 168 . In
addition, banks may use financial derivatives to lower
their cost of funding and to reduce undesirable exposure to
interest rate changes or currency fluctuations 169 . Banks
control approximately seventy percent of the off-exchange
derivative activities 170 . Although National Banks have been
authorized for several years to engage in financial
derivative activities 171 , with exception of New York 172 ,
there appears to be little published guidance for State
Banks. Ten banks, or their affiliates, accounted for
approximately ninety percent of bank derivative activity
with respect to interest rate contracts as of September
1992 173
. Six of these ten banks were National Banks, and the
remaining four were New York State Banks 174 .
B. THE PURPOSE OF DERIVATIVES
Derivative contracts provide issuers and investors an
inexpensive way of controlling some major risks 175 (see
infra) . The primary risks are associated with unpredictable
(volatile) movements in foreign exchange and interest
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rates, as well as in the prices of equities and
commodities 176 . The four examples below illustrate the needs
for using derivative transactions in the business and
financial world.
1. Suppose that a particular company - we call it the
Prudential Investor - plans to obtain a bank loan for $100
million two months from now. The key risk here is that two
months from now the interest rate will be higher than it is
today. If the interest rate is only one percent higher,
Prudential Investor would have to pay $1 million more in
annual interest. So clearly, issuers/borrowers need a way
to protect against the rise in interest rates.
2. Presume that Prudential Investor Pension Fund owns
a portfolio consisting of common stock of a large number of
companies. In order to fulfill its obligations the pension
fund must make periodic payments to the beneficiaries of
the plan. Suppose the pension fund knows that two months
from now it must sell stock in its portfolio to pay off
beneficiaries $20 million. The risk that Prudential Pension
Fund faces is that two months from now when the stocks are
sold, the price of most or all stocks may be lower than
they are today. If, indeed, stock prices do decline, the
pension fund will have to sell off more shares to realize
$20 million. Thus, investors such as the Prudential Fund,
may want to protect against this kind of risk. The pension
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fund managers can hedge by selling in the futures markets
and lock in a selling price.
3. Suppose that another company the Prudential Trust
plans to issue a bond in Switzerland and the periodic
payments that the company must make to the bondholders are
denominated in the Swiss Currency, the franc. The amount of
U.S. dollars that Prudential Trust must pay to receive the
amount of Swiss francs it has contracted to pay depends
upon the exchange rate at the time the payment must be
made. For example, suppose that at the time Prudential
Trust plans to issue the bonds, the exchange rate is such
that one U.S. dollar is equal to 1.5 Swiss francs. So, for
each 7.5 million Swiss francs that Prudential must pay to
the bondholders, it must pay $5 million. If at any time
that a payment must be made in Swiss francs, the value of
the U.S. dollar declines to the Swiss franc, Prudential
Trust will have to pay more U.S. dollars to satisfy its
contractual obligation. If, for example, one U.S. dollar at
the time of a payment changes to 1.25 Swiss francs,
Prudential would have to pay $ 6 million to make a payment
of 7.5 million Swiss francs. This is $1 million more than
when it issued the bonds. All Issuers/borrowers who raise
funds in currency that is not their local currency face
this kind of risk. To illustrate another example, consider
an ordinary commodities future contract for gold selling at
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$400 per ounce. Party A believes the price of gold will
rise while party B believes the price of gold will fall. A
and B might enter into a contract in which A will buy from
B, and B will sell to A, 100 ounces of gold at $400 per
ounce on a specified date in the future ("expiration
date") . If the price of gold falls to $380 per ounce on the
expiration date, B can buy gold at the market price and
sell it to A at a profit of $20 an ounce. Hence, A will
have bought the gold at $2 per ounce more than the spot
market price at the expiration date. If, however, the price
of gold rises to $420 per ounce, A can buy gold from B at
$400 per ounce and sell it at the market price for a profit
of $20 per ounce. So, derivatives permit end-users and
dealers to identify, isolate, and manage separately the
fundamental risks and other characteristics that are bound
together in traditional financial instruments 177 .
Derivatives are a means by which elements of risk can be
stripped away from a transaction, providing the user with
cost effective protection from the market volatility178 .
Desired combinations of cash flow, interest rate, currency,
liquidity, and market source characteristics can be
achieved largely by separate choices, each independent of
the underlying cash market instrument 179 . As a result,
management is able to think and act in terms of fundamental
risks. Derivatives are used by thousands of entities
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worldwide, typically in the pursuit of one or more of the
three following goals 180 : (1) hedging, (2) reducing funding
costs, and (3) speculation.
CHAPTER V:
TYPES OF DERIVATIVE INTRUMENTS AND KEY FEATURES
A. FUTURES MARKETS
1. Definition
A future contract is a legal agreement between a buyer
and a seller in which:
- the buyer agrees to take delivery of something at a
specified price at the end of a designated period of time;
- the seller agrees to make delivery of something at a
specified price at the end of a designated period of
time 181 . Of course, no one buys or sells anything when
entering into a futures contract. Rather, the parties to
the contract agree to buy or sell a specific amount of a
specific item at a specified future date 182 . Let us consider
the key elements of this contract. The price at which
parties agree to transact in the future is called the
futures price 183 . The designated date at which the parties
must transact is called the settlement date or delivery
date 184 . The "something" that the parties agree to exchange
is called the underlying 185 . The buyer of a futures
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contract, who has the obligation to buy the good at the
later date, can sell the contract in the futures market,
which relieves him or her of the obligation to purchase the
good186 . Likewise, the seller of the futures contract, who
is obligated to sell the good at a later date, can buy the
contract back in the futures market, relieving him or her
of the obligation to sell the good 187 .
2. Illustration : A Simple Numerical Example
Assume that there is a futures contract traded on an
exchange where the underlying asset to be bought or sold is
asset ABC and the settlement date is three months from now.
Assume further that party one called Bruce buys this future
contracts and that party two called Sally sells this
futures contract and that the price at which they agree to
transact in the future is $100. $100 is the futures price.
So, at the settlement date Sally will deliver asset ABC to
Bruce and Bruce will give Sally $100 the futures price.
Suppose that one month after the deal, the futures price
the asset increases to $120; Bruce - the buyer - of the
futures contract, could then sell the futures contract and
realize a profit of $20. Indeed, he has agreed to buy, at
the settlement date asset ABC for $100 but it is worth
$120. Suppose that the future price falls to $40, Sally
realizes a profit of $60 because she agreed to sell asset
48
ABC for $100 and now can buy it on the market for $40. In
this case, Bruce would realize a loss of $60. Thus, if the
futures price decreases the buyer of the futures contract
realizes a loss while the seller of the future contract
realizes a profit 188 . When an investor takes a position in
the market by buying a futures contract (or agreeing to buy
at the future date) , the investor is said to be in a long
position or to be long futures 189 . Conversely, if the
investor' s opening position is the sale of a futures
contract (which means the contractual obligation to sell
something in the future) , the investor is said to be in a
short position or to be short futures 190 .
3. Creation of a Futures Contract
Futures contracts are products created by exchanges 191 .
To create a particular future contract, an exchange must
obtain approval from the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission 192 . In its application to the CFTC, the exchange
must demonstrate that there is an economic purpose for that
contract 193 . While numerous futures contracts obtain
approval for trading, only those contracts that spark
investor interest and serve investor needs ultimately
succeed 194 . The basic economic function of the future
markets is to provide an opportunity for market
participants to hedge against the risk of adverse price
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movements. In the United States, the development of the
markets for futures and options on stock indexes and debt
obligations was a response to the need for an efficient
risk-transference mechanism as stock price and interest
rate volatility in the United States increased 195 . Prior to
1972, only futures contracts involving traditional
agricultural commodities (such as grain and livestock),
imported foodstuffs (such as coffee, cocoa and sugar) or
industrial commodities were traded 196 . Collectively, such
contracts are known as commodities futures. Futures
contracts based on financial instruments or financial index
are known as financial futures 197 .
4. Liquidating a Position
Most financial futures contracts have settlements
dates in March, June, September or December 198 . This means
that, at a predetermined time, the contract settlement
month, the contract stops trading and a price is determined
by the exchange for settlement 199 . A party to a futures
contract has two choices on liquidation of the position.
First, the position can be liquidated prior to the
settlement date: the party must take an offsetting position
in the same contract 200 . For the buyer of a futures
contract, this means selling the same number of identical
futures contracts; for the seller of a futures contract,
50
this means buying the same number of identical futures
contracts 201 . Second, the alternative is to wait until the
settlement date: at that time, the purchaser of a futures
contract accepts delivery of the asset; the party that
sells a futures contract liquidates the position by
delivering the underlying asset at the agreed upon price 202 .
5. The Role of the Clearinghouse
Associated with every futures exchange is a
clearinghouse, which performs several functions. One
function is to guarantee that the two parties to the
transaction will perform203 . For each transaction,
obviously, there is a buyer, usually called the long, and a
seller called the short 204 . In the absence of the
clearinghouse, each party would be responsible to the
other. If one party defaults, the other would be left with
a worthless claim. The clearinghouse exists to meet this
problem. When someone takes a position in the futures
market the clearinghouse takes the opposite position and
agrees to satisfy the terms set forth in the contract205 .
The clearinghouse interposes itself as the buyer for
every sale and the seller for every purchase206 . So, the two
parties are then free to liquidate their positions without
involving the other party in the original contract, and
without worry that the other party may default 207 . This is
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called the guarantee function of the clearinghouse.
Besides, the clearinghouse makes it simple for the parties
to a futures contract to unwind their positions prior to
the settlement date 208 . Suppose that one party wants to get
out of his futures position. He or she will not have to
seek out the other party and work out an agreement with him
or her to terminate the original agreement. Instead, he or
she can unwind his or her position by selling an identical
futures contract 209 . At the settlement date, the seller will
not deliver the asset to the original buyer but will be
instructed by the clearinghouse to deliver to someone who
bought and still has an open futures position210 . In the
case of options contracts the Clearinghouse is known as the
Options Clearing Corporation (OCC) which is also an
independent corporation that guarantees the writer'
s
performance211 .
6. Margin Requirements
When a position is first taken in a futures contract,
the investor must deposit a minimum dollar amount per
contract as specified by the exchange 212 . This amount,
called initial margin, is required as a deposit for the
contract 213 .
At the end of each trading day, the exchange
determines the "settlement price" for the futures
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contract 214 . The exchange uses the settlement price to mark
to market the investor' s position, so that any gain or loss
from the position is quickly reflected in the investor's
equity account215 .
Additionally, we have the maintenance margin which is
the minimum level to which an investor's equity position
may fall as a result of an unfavorable price movement
before the investor is requirement to deposit additional
margin216 .
The additional margin deposited is called variation
margin, and it is the amount necessary to bring the equity
in the account back to its initial margin level 217 . If a
party to a futures contract who is required to deposit
variation margin fails to do so within 24 hours, the
exchange closes the futures position out 218 . To illustrate
the Mark-To-Market procedure, let us assume the following
requirements for asset ABC: Initial margin $7 per contract
and maintenance margin $4 per contract. Let us assume that
Bruce buys 500 contracts at futures prices of $100 and
Sandra sells the same number of contracts at the same
price. Initial margin for Bruce and Sandra is $3,500 which
is determined by multiplying the initial margin of $7 by
numbers of contracts which is 500. Bruce and Sandra must
put up $3,500 in cash. The maintenance margin for the 2
positions is $2,000 (500 x 4) which means that the equity
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in the account may not fall below $2,000. If it does, the
party whose equity falls below the maintenance margin must
put up additional margins 219 . When the investor decide to
trade futures, he has to make daily cash payments to the
stock exchange in the event the trades go against him220 .
These cash payments are called "variation margin
payments" or " market-to-market payments. //221 Each day the
Stock Exchange makes a running calculation on the value of
the futures the trader has bought or sold and if the
current price has moved too far away from his traded price,
the dealer has to pay up and the cash he pays is passed on
by the stock exchange to the clearinghouses 222 . Conversely,
if the price goes with the trader, he will receive cash
payments via the stock exchange. The Stock Exchange thus
works as a transparent financial house which matches all
the buyers and sellers and passes the money back and forth
each day. The reason for these payments is to avoid
problems being caused to the market or to other users by
anyone defaulting on their contractual obligations 223 .
Futures and options are so volatile that if no payments
were made until they expired, the loser could face an
enormous liability and end up collapsing without being able
to fulfill his obligations. This, in turn, could lead to a
domino sequence where all the brokers collapse. By
demanding payment each day the Stock Exchange ensures that
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everybody in the market knows exactly what their position
is.
7. The Leveraging Aspect of the Futures
One major aspect of derivatives is that, for a small
down payment, the purchaser can control a larger portion of
the market. For example, $10,000 could buy a contract to
purchase $100,000 worth of bonds later. Such leverage means
potential gains or losses are magnified. A party taking a
position in a futures contract need not to put up the
entire amount of the investment. Instead, the exchange or
clearinghouse requires only the initial margin to be put
up. To see the crucial consequences of this aspect, suppose
Bruce has $100 and wants to invest in asset ABC because he
believes its price will increase. If asset ABC is selling
for 100 he can buy one unit of the asset. His payoff will
be based on the price action of one unit asset ABC. Suppose
further that the exchange where the futures contract for
asset ABC is traded requires an initial margin of only 5%
which in this case would be $5. This means that Bruce can
buy 20 contracts with his $100 investment. His payoff will
then depend on the price action of 20 unites of asset ABC.
Thus, he can leverage the use of his funds.
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8. Daily Price Limits
The exchange has the right to impose a limit on the
daily price movement of a futures contract from the
previous day's closing price 224 . A daily price limit sets
the minimum and maximum price at which the futures contract
may trade that day225 . The rationale offered for the
imposition of this rule is that it provides stability to
the market at times when new information may cause the
futures price to exhibit extreme fluctuations and
stability, in turn, puts greater confidence in the
market 226 .
9. Futures versus Forward Contracts
A forward contract, just like a futures contract, is
an agreement for the future delivery of something at a
specified price at the end of a designated period of
time 227 . Forward contracts, sometimes called forward
commitments 228 , are very common in everyday life 229 . For
example, an apartment lease is a series of forward
contracts 230 . The current month's use of the apartment is a
spot transaction, but the two parties also have agreed to
usage of the apartment for future months at a rent agreed
upon today. A forward contract is usually nonstandardized
because the terms of each contract are negotiated
individually between the buyer and seller231 . Unlike futures
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contract, which is an exchanged-traded product, a forward
contract is an over-the-counter instrument 232 ( see infra).
Although both futures and forward contracts set forth
terms of delivery, futures contracts are not intended to be
settled by delivery233 . Forward contracts, in contrast, are
intended for delivery234 . Most of what we say about futures
contracts applies equally to forward contracts.
10. The Role of Futures in Financial Markets and
Applications of Futures Contracts
a. The Role of Futures Markets
Without financial futures, investors would have only
one trading location to alter portfolio positions when they
get new information that is expected to influence the value
of the assets: the cash market 235 . If investors hear
economic news that is expected to impact the value of an
asset adversely, they want to reduce their price risk
exposure to that asset 236 . The opposite would be true if the
new information is expected to impact the value of an asset
favorably; an investor would increase price risk exposure
to that asset 237 . There are, of course, transactions costs
associated with altering exposure to an asset: explicit
costs (commissions), execution costs 238 . The futures markets
is an alternative market that investors can use to alter
their risk exposure to an asset when new information is
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acquired239 . But which market - cash or futures- should the
investor employ to alter a position quickly on the receipt
of new information ? The answer is simple: the one that
most efficiently achieves the objective. The factors to
consider are liquidity, transactions costs, taxes, and
leverages advantages of the futures contracts 240 . Financial
futures are traded to either speculate on prices of
securities for example, or hedge (i.e., a transaction in
which an investor seeks to protect a position or
anticipated position in the spot market by using an
opposite position in derivatives) existing exposure to
security price movements. The speculators in financial
futures markets take positions to profit from expected
changes in price of futures contracts over time. Other
participants, hedgers, take positions to reduce their
exposure to future movements in interest rates or stock
prices. The key role of futures contracts is that, in a
well functioning futures market, these contracts provide a
more efficient means for investors to alter their risk
exposure to an asset. Futures contract present benefits:
liquidity, transaction costs, taxes and leverage. The major
function of futures markets is to transfer price risk from
hedgers to speculators 241 , i.e, risk is transferred from
those willing to pay to avoid risk to those wanting to
assume risk in the hope of gain.
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a.l) Hedging
The term "hedging" refers to the risk management
activities investors engage in to reduce their exposure to
unpredictable changes in the market 242 . Used as a risk
management tool, derivatives allow end-users to reduce
inherent market risks, creating a more stable and
predictable cash flow that is insulated from market
swings 243 . This goal is attainable because derivatives
provide a means by which end-users can shift the risks
presented by market fluctuations to a player who is willing
to bear such risks 244 . The term short hedge and long hedge
distinguish hedges that involve short and long positions in
the futures contract, respectively245 . For example, a hedger
who holds the commodity and is concerned about a decrease
in its price might consider hedging it with a short
position. If the spot price decreases, the futures price
also will decrease. As the hedger is short the futures
contract, the futures transaction produces a profit that at
least partially offsets the loss on the spot position.
Hedging is the employment of a futures transaction as a
temporary substitute for a transaction in the cash
market246 . As long as cash and futures prices move together,
any loss realized on one position (whether cash or futures)
will be offset by a profit on the other position247 . When
the profit and loss are equal, the hedge is called a
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perfect hedge 248 . In a market where the futures contract is
correctly priced, a perfect hedge is risk-free and,
therefore, should provide a return equal to the risk-free
rate 249 .
a. 2) Why Do Firms Hedge?
Assuming that shareholders of a company cannot assess
all of the financial risks themselves, hedging may be
desired by the shareholders simply because they want to
find a more acceptable combination of risk and return250 . In
addition there may be other reasons why firms hedge, such
as tax advantages 251 . Low-income firms, for example those
who are below the highest coporate tax rate, can
particularly benefit from the interaction between hedging
and the progressive corporate income tax structure 252 .
Hedging also reduces the risk of bankruptcy and may send a
signal to potential creditors that the firms is making a
concerted effort to protect the value of the underlying
assets 253 . This can result in more favorable credit terms
and less costly, restrictive covenants 254 .
a. 3) Hedging :It Is the Law
Rarely does a firm have to worry about whether failing
to hedge is breaking the law. In Indiana, it just might be.
In Brane v. Roth255
, a farmers cooperative is engaged in the
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business of buying, storing and selling grain and the
profits had been declining steadily over the period of
1977-1979. In 1979, its accountant recommended to its Board
of Directors that the cooperative begin hedging in the
futures market. The Board did authorize the financial
manager to begin hedging. But a total of only about $20,000
of grain was hedged, during a period in which its grain
sales were over $7 million256 . Subsequently, the cooperative
experienced substantial operating losses. Shareholders
determined that a hedge would have saved the cooperative
and sued the Board of Directors. The plaintiffs argued that
the Board breached its duty by using a manager
inexperienced in hedging and by failing to supervise the
manager257 . The plaintiffs also argued that the Board
members failed to learn enough about hedging to protect
shareholders' interests. The Superior Court of Miami
County, Indiana agreed and ordered the directors to pay
over $400,000 to the plaintiffs 258 . The case was appealed to
the Indiana Court of Appeals, which upheld the judgment in
April 1992 259 , endorsing the argument that the losses were
caused by a failure to hedge and that the directors had
made no effort to learn about hedging. It seems that, in
this case, where the directors erred was in failing to be
properly informed about the advantages and disadvantages of
hedging while authorizing, but not supervising, a modest
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hedging program. Had they made the effort to learn about
the futures market, they might well have easily justified
the small hedging program as experimental. So, is failing
to hedge illegal? Probably not, at least not yet. But it is
clear that Board of Directors, and management, are
vulnerable to the charge that they failed to learn how
derivative markets can help them run a business and avoid
losses. Hedging or failing to hedge is a decision that
should be taken by the Board of Directors and is protected
by the Business Judgement rule. On the other hand, it is
also true that failing to disclose that the company is not
hedging might be considered as such important information
that it should be made public so that it would be properly
reflected in the stock price. Anyway, the question might be
asked if the shareholders may not be able to lay off these
risk more cheaply by holding a diversified portfolio of
shares in a variety of companies.
a. 4) Risks Associated with Hedging
In practice hedging is not simple. The amount of the
loss or profit on a hedge will depend upon the relationship
between the cash price and the futures price at two points
in time, when a hedge is placed and when it is lifted260 . If
a futures contract is priced according to its theoretical
value, the difference between the cash price and the
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futures price should be equal to the cost of carry261 . The
risk that the hedger takes on is that the basis will change
for some reason. Therefore, hedging involves the
substitution of basis risk for price risk, i.e., the
substitution of the risk that the basis will change for the
risk that the cash price will change 262 . In some cases, the
price of the commodity being hedged and that of the futures
contract move in opposite directions 263 . Then, a hedge will
produce either a profit or a loss on both the spot and the
futures positions. Hedging also entails another form of
risk called quantity risk264 . Suppose a farmer wants to lock
in the price at which an as yet unharvested crop will be
sold265 . The farmer might sell a futures contract and
thereby establish the future selling price of the crop. Yet
what the farmer does not know and cannot hedge is the
uncertainty over the size of the crop266 . The farmer's total
revenue is the product of the crop's price and its size 267 .
This risk is not restricted to farming. Many corporations
and financial institutions do not kwow the size of future
hedge positions and thus must contend with quantity risk.
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b. Applications of Futures Contracts
b.l) Common Applications
Investors can use different strategies. They can use
stock index futures, interest rates futures for distinct
purposes such as:
- speculating on the movement of the stock market;
- controlling the risk of stock portfolio;
- hedging against adverse stock price or interest rate
movements;
- engaging in index arbitrage.
A stock index futures contract allows for the buying
and selling of a stock index for a specified price at a
specified date 268 . For example, there is a futures contract
on the S&P 500 Index which represents a composite of 500
large corporations. Participants who expect the stock
market to perform well before the settlement date may
consider purchasing S&P 500 Index Futures. Conversely,
participants who expect the stock market to perform poorly
before the settlement date may consider selling the S&P 500
Index Futures. Investment banking firms can use hedging
strategies to protect against adverse interest rate
movements. Presume, for example, an investment banker
called Prudential Brothers underwriting $1 billion of ABC
bonds. To protect itself against a rise in interest rates,
which would reduce the value of the bonds, Prudential
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Brothers sell (short) Treasury Futures. Let us further
assume that interest rates rise upon an announcement by the
Federal Reserve Board. The value of the ABC bonds held by
Prudential Brothers are declining in value but so do the
Treasury Bond Futures contracts. Because Prudential
Brothers has sold the futures, it realized a gain which
reduced the loss on the bonds it underwrote. Another
strategy, Stock index arbitrage, is the purchase or sale of
a portfolio of stock that replicates a stock index and the
sale or purchase of a futures contract on the index 269 .
Derivatives can be used to arbitrage price
discrepancies in financial markets. Arbitrage is a type of
transaction in which an investor seeks to profit when the
same good sells for two different prices270 . The individual
engaging in the arbitrage, called the arbitrageur, buys the
good at the lower price and immediately sells it at the
higher price 271 . If a stock sells on one exchange at one
price and on another at a different price, arbitrageurs
will go to work buying at the low price and selling at the
high price. The low price will be driven up and the high
price driven down until the two prices are equal 272 .
Arbitrage thus, keeps prices in line. Another type of
arbitrage can be used to take advantage of differences in
the cost of capital. For example, suppose a multinational
firm needs to borrow dollars but could receive a
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preferential loan rate from a lender in Germany. This firm
might borrow German marks (DM) at the more favorable
interest rate and convert the DM to dollars in the currency
market. Then, to hedge the exchange rate risk of the future
loan payments, the firm might enter into a dollar/DM
currency swap (i.e. pay dollars/ receive DM). In effect, in
this case, the multinational firms borrows dollars at the
lower German interest rate.
b.2) Circuit Breakers On Stock Index Futures
The 1987 stock market crash led to recommendations by
a presidential task force to recommend circuit breakers to
prevent further crashes 273 . Circuit breakers are trading
restrictions imposed on specific stock or stock indexes 274 .
For example, if the Dow Jones Industrial Average Stock
Index declines by 250 points below the previous day's
closing price, the New York Stock Exchange prohibits
trading for one hour. The purpose is to allow investors to
determine whether any previous rumors were true and to work
out credit arrangements if they received a margin call 275 .
b.3) Currency Derivative Markets: Another possible
Application of Futures
Since the downfall of the Bretton Woods system , the
currencies of all countries have been fluctuating freely
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which means that all exchanges rates of free countries
fluctuate with market conditions. The volatility of
exchanges rates should be viewed as a source of risk for
companies doing business in more than one country.
The parties can enter into a currency futures contract
which is an agreement between two parties in which one
party agrees to buy the currency from the other party at a
later date at an exchange rate agreed upon today276 . It
trades on a futures exchange and works essentially the same
as any other type of futures contract. As noted earlier, a
long hedge with futures involves the purchase of a futures
contract. In the case of foreign currencies, for example, a
long hedger is concerned that the value of the foreign
currency will rise. Consider an American car dealer who
plans to buy 20 British sports cars and each car costs
£35,000 which, of course, will have to be paid in British
currency. Let us assume that based on the current forward
rate of the pound, the dealers' expected cost is $914,200.
If the pound increases in value, the cars will end up
costing more. Therefore, the dealer wants to hedge by
buying futures on the pound and as long as the pound spot
and futures rates move in the same direction, the hedge
will be successful in reducing some of the loss in the spot
market 277 . We have talked about currency futures and
options. However, there a number of other related ways to
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manage foreign exchange risk. It is common, for example,
for firms doing business internationally to use currency
swaps 278 for hedging purposes.
B. OPTIONS MARKETS
1. Definition and Key Elements
a. Definition
There are two parties to an option contract: the buyer
and the writer or seller. The writer (seller) of the option
grants the buyer of the option the right but not the
obligation, to buy from or sell to the writer something at
a specified price within a specified period of time or at a
specified date 279 . The writer grants this right to the buyer
in exchange for a certain sum of money which is called the
option price or option premium280 . The price at which the
underlying asset or commodity may be bought or sold is
called the exercise price or strike price 281 . When an option
grants the buyer the right to purchase the underlying asset
from the writer (seller) - it is referred to as a call
option or simply a call 282 . When the option buyer has the
right to sell the underlying asset to the writer - it is
referred to as a put option or simply a put 283 . The timing
of the possible exercise of an option is an important
characteristic of the contract. There are options that may
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be exercised at any time up to including the expiration
date 284 . Such options are referred to as American options 285 .
Other options may be exercised only at the expiration
date; these are called European options 286 .
b. Illustrations
b.l) Call Options
Consider the following illustration: on June 21, 1996, the
Chicago Board of Options Exchange offered Options on the
stock of Prudential Investor. One particular call option
had an exercise price of $80 and an expiration date of July
15. The Prudential Investor stock had a price of $77,625.
The buyer of this option received the right to buy the
stock any time up through July 15 at $80 per share. The
writer of that option therefore was obligated to sell the
stock at $80 per share through July 15 whenever the buyer
wanted it. For this privilege, the buyer paid the writer
the premium, or price, of $1,375. The buyer anticipates
that the stock's price would rise above $80 before the
option expires. Conversely, the writer expects that the
stock price would not get above $80 before the option
expires.
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b.2) Put options
Consider the put option on Prudential Investor stock
on June 21, 1996, with an exercise price of $80 per share
and an expiration date of July 15. It allows the put holder
to sell the stock at $80 per share any time up through July
15. The stock currently is selling for $77,625. Therefore,
the put holder can elect to exercise the option, selling
the stock to the writer for $80 per share. However, the put
holder may prefer to wait and see if the stock price falls
further below the exercise price. The put buyer expects the
stock price to fall, while the writer expects it to remain
the same or rise. The buyer and the writer negotiated a
premium of $3.75, which the buyer paid to the writer.
2, Difference Between Option and Futures Contracts
In an option contract, the option buyer has the right,
but not the obligation, to exercise the option. On the
other hand, the writer does have the obligation to perform.
In the case of a futures contract both buyer and seller are
constrained to perform. The relation risk/rewards features
are also different. In a futures contract, the buyer of the
contract realizes a dollar for dollar gain when the price
of the futures contract increases, and suffers a dollar for
dollar loss when the price drops 287 . The opposite occurs for
the seller of a futures contract 288 . In an option contract,
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the most that the buyer can lose is the option price. The
maximum profit that the writer may realize is the option
price. There are no margin requirements for the buyer of an
option once the option price has been paid in full 289 .
Because the option price is the maximum amount that
the investor can lose, no matter how adverse the price
movement of the underlying asset, no margin is needed290 .
Because the writer (seller) of an option has agreed to
accept all of the risk (and none of the reward) of the
position in the underlying asset, the writer is generally
required to put up the option price received as margin291 .
In addition, as price changes occur that adversely
affect the writer' s position, the writer is required to
deposit additional margin (with some exceptions) as the
position is marked-to-market 292 . Options may be traded
either on an organized exchange or in the over-the-counter
market.
3. Futures Options
An option on a futures contract, referred to as a
futures option, gives the buyer the right to buy from or
sell to the writer a designated futures contract at a
designated price at any time during the life of the
option293 . If the futures option is a call option, the buyer
has the right to purchase one designated futures contract
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at the exercise price 294 , i.e., the buyer has the right to
acquire a long futures position in the designated futures
contract. If the buyer exercises the call option, the
writer (seller) acquires a corresponding short position in
the futures contract 295 . A put option futures contract
grants the buyer the right to sell one designated futures
contract to the writer at the exercise price 296 .
4. Applications of Options Markets
a. Stock Options and Stock Index Options
Stock Options can be used to take advantage of the
anticipated price movement of individual stocks.
Alternatively they can help protect current or anticipated
positions in individual stocks 297 .
b. Interest Rate Options
An institutional investor can use interest rate
options or options on interest rate futures to speculate on
fixed-income security price movements based on expectations
of interest rates changes 298 .
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C. REGULATION OF FUTURES AND OPTIONS MARKETS
1. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and
Stock Exchange Commission (SEC) Regulate Trading in
Options and Futures
Two agencies share responsibility for the Federal
regulation of trading in futures and options. The Commodity
Futures Trading Commission licenses futures exchanges and
monitors trading in them299 . It authorizes firms to operate
the exchanges and provide services to the public 300 .
The CFTC also approves individual futures contracts
which must serve the economic purpose for being useful for
hedging 301 . Approval is not an endorsement of a contract,
investors trade these securities at their own risk 302 . The
SEC has responsibility for oversight of most options
markets and it performs many of the functions the CFTC
performs with futures markets 303 . An exchange that wants to
create an options contract must obtain approval from either
the CFTC or the Securities and Exchange Commission.
a. Regulation of Options
The exchange-traded options industry is regulated at
several levels. While Federal and state regulations
predominate, the industry also regulates itself according
to rules and standards established by the exchanges and the
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Options Clearing Corporation 304 . The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) is the primary regulator of the options
market 305 . The SEC's general purpose is to ensure full
disclosure of all pertinent information on publicly offered
investments 306 . It has the authority to establish certain
rules and procedures and to investigate possible violation
of Federal securities laws 307 . If the SEC observes a
violation it may seek injunctive relief, recommend that the
Justice Department press charges, or impose some sanctions
itself 308 .
b. Regulation of Futures
While forward markets are largely unregulated and
traded over-the-counter, futures markets are heavily
regulated309 . Many regulators and legislators have taken a
dim view of futures trading, likening it to gambling310 . In
the nineteenth century, there were numerous attempts to
outlaw futures trading 311 . In 1974 Congress passed the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act which created the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, a Federal Reserve
agency that regulates futures markets 312 .
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D. TRADING LOCATIONS
1 . Stock Exchanges
An exchange is a legal corporate entity organized for
the trading of securities, options or futures 313 . It
provides a physical facility and stipulates rules and
regulations governing the transactions in the instruments
trading thereon 314 . One of the exchange's important ongoing
activities is identifying new and useful futures contracts.
When the exchange determines that a contract is likely
to be successful, it writes a proposal specifying the terms
and conditions and applies to the CFTC, the regulatory
activity, for permission to initiate trading 315 . Whether the
contract will be actively traded will depend on whether it
fills the needs of hedgers and whether speculators are
interested enough to take risks in it 316 . Organized
exchanges filled the need for standardized option contracts
wherein the exchange would specify the contracts' terms and
conditions 317 . As a result, a secondary market for the
contracts was made possible. By providing a physical
trading floor, specifying rules and regulations, and
standardizing contracts, options became as marketable as
stocks 318 . The New York Stock Exchange and American Stock
Exchange are for example two organized exchanges for
secondary stock market transactions.
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2. Over-the-Counter Market (OTC)
A large amount of option trading is conducted
privately between two parties who find that contracting
with each other may be preferable to public transactions on
the exchange. The Over-the-Counter market is basically a
telecommunications network 319 . Most of the options created
on the over-the-counter market are options on bonds,
interest rates, commodities, swaps, foreign currencies and
include many variations that combine options with other
instruments 320 . The scope of this market, dominated by
institutional investors is world-wide 321 . These private
contracts are entered into by large corporations, financial
institutions, and sometimes even governments in which the
option buyer is either familiar with the creditworthiness
of the writer or has had the credit risk reduced by some
type of collateral guarantee or other credit enhancement 322 .
OTC intermediaries may act as brokers, matching parties
with offsetting needs. More typically, intermediaries act
as counterparties, taking the other side of the contracts
with their customers. Without intermediaries, it would be
difficult for firms particularly nonfinancial firms, to
find willing counterparties in a timely fashion. Thus,
intermediaries increase the liquidity of the OTC
derivatives market and, thereby, make OTC derivatives more
useful to end-users. Although there is always some credit
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risk involved, these types of OTC contracts do have several
advantages. The first advantage is that the terms and
conditions of these contracts, which are entered into
privately, can be tailored to the specific needs of the two
parties 323 , avoiding thereby the mandatory rules and
regulations of the exchanges. The second benefit is that
the over-the-counter market is a private market in which
neither the general public nor other investors, including
competitors, need know that the transactions were
completed324 . A third advantage for investors is that this
market is essentially unregulated: its rules are those of
common sense business honesty and courtesy325 . This largely
unregulated environment means that government approval is
not needed to offer new types of options 326 . An inevitable
drawback omnipresent in this market is that credit risk
exists, excluding many customers who are unable to
establish their creditworthiness in this market 327 .
This is also one of the reasons why banks have played
such a large role in the growth of the OTC market. Banks'
creditworthiness is well known to other investors, so money
center banks are readily accepted as counterparties in OTC
trades. In addition, banks already lend to many of the
investors in OTC derivatives, thus they already know more
than other market participants about the creditworthiness
of these investors. And in cases where a bank is not
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already familiar with a particular investor, the bank
possesses the expertise to make an informed judgment of
creditworthiness. Nonetheless, because of the private
nature of the transactions that take place in this market,
it is difficult to measure its size 326 . The over-the-counter
market is an unregulated market, dominated by customs and
accepted procedures. The participating firms, however, are
often regulated by the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD) and many participants are banks who are
overseen by various regulatory authorities but neither the
SEC nor the CFTC has direct regulatory authority over the
OTC options market 329 . On the other hand, exchange-traded
instruments present also advantages over the over-the-
counter market. The first is the standardization of the
exercise price, the quantity of the underlying asset, and
the expiration date of the contract 330 . Second, as in the
case of futures contracts, the direct link between buyer
and seller is severed after the order is executed because
of the interchange ability of exchange-traded options 331 .
The clearinghouse associated with the exchange where the
option trades performs the same function (a guarantee
function) in the options market that it does in the futures
market 332 . Finally, the transaction costs are lower for
exchange-traded options than for OTC options 333 . The higher
cost of an OTC option reflects the cost of customizing the
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option for the common situation where an institutional
investor needs to have a tailor-made option because the
standardized exchange-traded option does not satisfy its
investment objectives 334 .
a. Swaps Considered To Be The Quintessential OTC
Derivative Swaps, considered to be the quintessential OTC
derivative 335 , are a type of forward contract in which two
parties agree to exchange a series of payments according to
agreed-upon terms over a set period of time 336 . The amount
of the payments involved is determined with reference to an
agreed-upon notional amount which, aside from currency swap
transactions, is seldom actually exchanged337 . Because the
terms of a swap must be carefully tailored to benefit the
parties' needs, this type of derivative instrument is a
privately negotiated, OTC transaction. These periodic
payments may be fixed338 or floating339 , and the exchange is
made because each party seeks the form of payment held by
the other party340 . To illustrate how a swap works, imagine
two mortgagors holding mortgages with a current interest
rate of ten percent. Mortgagor A' s mortgage has a floating
interest rate, and A believes that interest rates will
rise. Mortgagor B holds a fixed rate mortgage, and he is
convinced that interest rates will go down. In this case,
each mortgagor believes his position would be enhanced if
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only his mortgage carried the form of interest rate (a type
of periodic payment) held by the other. A common swap
agreement, known as an "interest rate swap" 341 , would allow
each mortgagor to get his wish by, in effect, contractually
agreeing to take the other's interest position. At the end
of a period of time specified in the contract, the
mortgagors would "settle up" between themselves based on
the actual movement of interest rates 342 . These payments
would normally be calculated and made on the same day,
allowing the parties simply to net their payments; the
party who, at the end of the given period, holds the higher
of the two interest obligations simply pays the other the
net difference 343 . If, in our example, interest rates
increased during the period, mortgagor B would owe
mortgagor A an amount equal to the net difference in the
amount due under each rate. Had interest rates decreased
during the given period, the same obligations would exist,
except that it would then be mortgagor A who owed mortgagor
B the net amount. It is important to note that, e,ven after
mortgagors entered into the swap contract, each still held,
and was bound by the terms of his original mortgage
agreement. The swap arrangement, however, effectively
converted the interest component of mortgagor A' s debt from
a floating to a fixed rate, and mortgagor B's interest
component from a fixed to a floating rate 344 . Swaps are
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commonly used as hedging devices by corporations, banks,
and other financial institutions. End-users of swaps are
often hesitant to deal directly with one another (usually
because each party feels it cannot adequately assess the
other party's creditworthiness), creating an opportunity
for banks and other financial institutions to act as
intermediaries 345 . As intermediary, a bank enters into a
swap arrangement with both parties and accepts the risks
associated with both transactions 346 . Bearing this risk
allows the intermediary to command a higher fixed or
floating rate on a swap than it pays on another, the spread
between the rates amounting to income 347 . As another
illustration of how swaps can provide such protection,
consider the case of a hypothetical bank. The nature of the
bank's business makes it an interest rate sensitive entity.
The bank has an extensive portfolio of floating rate loans,
but is also obliged to pay interest on deposits to attract
customers and capital 348 . While the floating rate on the
loan is adjusted often, the rate of interest paid on
deposits is adjusted less frequently - say biannually349 .
Because of the time lag in the frequency with which these
rates are adjusted, a downturn in market interest rates
would expose the bank to potential losses; interest
collected on outstanding loans would be adjusted downward
to reflect the market fluctuation, but the rate the bank
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pays on its deposits would not be reduced for some time 350 .
The bank's potential for loss, which in this case would be
from what is known as "interest rate risk", could be hedged
with a swap contract. Under the terms of such an agreement,
the bank would make payments based on some floating
interest rate, and in return would receive payments based
on a fixed interest rate from a counterparty, each rate
being determined with respect to some agreed-upon (though
usually hypothetical) notional amount 351 . Because of the
swap, the bank' s position is protected whether interest
rates rise or fall: if rates go up, the bank's earnings
from its floating rate loans increase, offsetting the
higher amounts it would then pay on the floating rate
obligations acquired in the swap. If, on the other hand,
interest rates decline, the bank's fixed-rate payouts will
be offset by the fixed-rate stream of income it receives
under the swap agreement. The downside of the agreement and
of hedge transactions in general, is that when an entity
transfers risk, the opportunity for gain is transferred as
well. A firm that hedges all its risks is protected from
losses but is equally prevented from realizing a gain. The
key for a bank in the derivatives market is to achieve a
balance between hedged positions and acceptable risks 352 .
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E. THE BENEFITS OF DERIVATIVE MARKETS
Due to their great flexibility, derivatives are used
by many different type of investors. A good toolbox of
derivatives allows the modern investor the full range of
investment strategy: speculation, hedging, arbitrage and
all combinations thereof. Derivatives have numerous
benefits over the corresponding cash (spot) market for the
same financial asset.
1. Risk management
Because derivatives are related to the prices of the
underlying spot market goods, they can be used to reduce or
increase the risk of investing in the spot items 353 .
In general, rational investors want to keep their
investments at an acceptable risk level. Derivative markets
enable those wishing to reduce their risk to transfer it to
those wishing to increase it 354 . As a result, investors are
willing to supply more funds to the financial markets,
which in turn, benefits the economy because it enables more
firms to raise capital and keeps the cost of capital as low
as possible 355 . An additional benefit realized by derivative
end-users is an enhancement of creditworthiness. An entity
that has reduced its exposure to market risks by hedging 356
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with derivatives is generally able to obtain more
preferable financial terms.
2. Price Discovery
It has been said that futures and forward markets for
example, are an important means of obtaining information
about investor's expectations of futures prices 357 .
Consequently, these markets can be used as an indicator and
contain information about future spot prices.
3. Operational Advantages
Depending on the derivative instrument, it may cost
less to execute a transaction in the derivatives market in
order to adjust the risk exposure of an investor's
portfolio to new economic information than it would cost to
make that adjustment in the cash market 358 . Derivatives
entail lower transaction costs 359 (commissions and other
trading costs are lower for traders in these markets)
.
4. Market Efficiency
Market efficiency is the characteristic of a market in
which the prices of the instruments trading therein reflect
their true economic values to investors 360 . As noted
earlier, we know that there is a linkage between spot and
derivative markets. The ease and low cost of trading in the
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derivative markets, facilitate the arbitrage trading and
rapid price adjustments that quickly eliminate these profit
opportunities 361 . Consequently, society benefits because the
prices of the underlying goods more accurately reflect the
goods' true economic values 362 .
5. Reduce Cost of Portfolio
Derivatives are also used as a tool by which end-users
reduce funding costs. In many cases, investing in a
derivative is considerably less costly than purchasing the
underlying asset itself because of reduced transaction
costs and the leverage the instrument provides 363
reduce the cost of administering a portfolio and enable
managers to buy and sell big positions without distorting
prices
.
6. Speculation
The derivatives market provide the opportunity for
speculation. The term speculation refers to the taking of
calculated risks in an attempt to profit by anticipating
(for speculating on) changes in the market 364 .
Where hedgers seek to protect themselves by
transferring risk, speculators take risks by betting on
fluctuations in the market value of derivatives or
underlying assets. Just as derivatives provide the hedger
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with an affordable means of protecting his position, a
speculator may likewise utilize derivatives to reap the
benefits (or incur the losses) of a market movement without
having to actually buy or sell the underlying asset 365 . In
general, the participation of speculators enhances the
market by providing an outlet onto which dealers can shift
the risks they have acquired from hedging end-users,
thereby adding liquidity to the market and ensuring that
participants cannot only take a position but get rid of it
as well 366 .
So, speculators play an important role in the market
by providing the liquidity that makes hedging possible and
assuming the risk that hedgers are trying to eliminate 367 .
Nonetheless, speculation is arguable and derivative markets
have taken much criticism from experts and outsiders for
this kind of activity. Speculators include locals as well
as the thousands of individuals and institutions off the
exchange floor 368 .
7. Derivatives Market Is Faster and More Liquid
Due to the smaller amount of capital required for
participation in derivative markets, these markets,
especially futures and options exchanges, have greater
liquidity than the spot markets 369 . Since little capital is
required to trade them, these markets can absorb more
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transactions. Some derivative markets can absorb a greater
dollar transaction without an adverse effect on price of
the derivative instrument, i.e., the derivative market may
be more liquid than the cash market 370 . In addition,
transactions typically can be accomplished faster in the
derivative markets 371 . However, one of the major attraction
of derivatives, the feature that gets people excited, is
gearing (or leverage in the U.S.). Gearing means simply the
ability for derivatives to soar 100% in a few days, when
the underlying asset, a security for example, has only
risen by 10%. Anyone who has a mortgage is geared to the
property market. The problem is that many derivatives allow
investors to make huge market bets without paying the full
price. Indeed, no money at all changes hands in some
derivative trades. That is one way derivatives reduce
investors' costs but it also means that they create a lot
of leverage in the system.
CHAPTER VI:
DANGERS AND RISKS OF DERIVATIVE ACTIVITIES
A. RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE USE OF DERIVATIVES
With the promise of increased rewards come increased
risks 372 . Derivatives carry risks similar to those
traditionally assumed by banks, especially banks dealing
with securities 373 . More specifically, derivatives pose six
risks: credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk,
operational risk, systemic risk and legal risk. Credit
risk, also called "counterparty risk" or "settlement risk",
is the risk that the bank's trading partner will be either
unwilling or unable to meet its contractual obligation 374 .
The buyer may be exposed to the risk that the seller
may default and not deliver the security. In fact, most
derivative transactions begin with no risk at all. In most
cases, credit risk develops only gradually, as market
prices change, and all of the risk is borne by that party
in whose favor the prices have changed. This risk, measured
by the replacement cost of the deal, is comparable to
classic credit exposure. Market risk, also called "position
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risk", is the risk that the value of the asset underlying a
derivative moves in a direction that reduces the value of
the derivative 375 . Two elements are at work: the volatility
of the underlying asset's value and the sensitivity of the
futures or options contract to changes in the underlying
asset value 376 . For example, the market value of an
underlying security purchased by a firm may fall before it
can be resold. In the case of an equity security, or stock,
concerns about the financial performance of the corporate
issuer may lead to a decline in the price of the
security377 . In the case of a debt security, or bond, the
nonpayment of principal or interest by the issuer, or a
change in interest rates, may lead to a subsequent decline
in the value of the security378 . Liquidity risk is the risk
that fluctuations in the price of derivatives will cause
unexpected changes in the cash flow of a bank rendering it
unable to meet its obligation 379 . Liquidity also includes
situations in which a market participant cannot execute a
transaction at a fair price because of wide bid-ask
spreads, meaning that a bank would have less certainty
about the true value of the instrument 380 . This risk is
particularly important in highly structured or customized
transactions because it may be difficult to locate a
counterparty to enter into a transaction in a timely
manner. Exchange-traded activities are less subject to
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market liquidity risks than are OTC traded derivatives
because of their use of standardized contracts and the
settlement role of the clearinghouse. Generally, the
liquidity of these instruments is impaired only in times of
financial stress. Operational risk is the risk associated
with human error, system failures or procedural
failures 381 (e.g. , database management, trade entry, trade
processing, trade confirmation, payment, delivery,
collateral management, valuation and related information
systems 382 ) . A big fear is that inadequate internal
controls, error, system failure or fraud lead to unexpected
losses and the bank may not even know it exceeds its
position limits 383 . In some cases, derivative transactions
are so intricate that they can be developed and priced only
through sophisticated mathematical models. Given that
complexity, the internal risk management and control
systems of banks engaged in these transactions must exhibit
a high level of sophistication. It is also essential that
effective lines of communication be established between
senior management and the management and staff of the
operating and trading departments that execute, value,
record, and monitor derivative product transactions.
Systemic risk can be defined as the risk that the financial
difficulties of one institution will cause financial harm
to other institutions and eventually cause a complete
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breakdown in the financial system384 . For example, the
collapse of securities prices could lead to the default of
one or more large banks or securities firms. Because of
financial interrelationships, this could lead to further
defaults of banks 385 . As noted earlier, technological
advances have increased the integration and efficiency of
the global financial market. Due to the linkage among the
markets, a series of defaults in one market could swiftly
extend into the banking system and cause a disruption in
the flow of payments and settlements of financial
transactions throughout the world386 . Shocks could be
transmitted from one domestic market to other domestic
markets. Such a breakdown in capital markets could disrupt
the process of saving and investment, undermine the long-
term confidence of private investors, and disrupt the
normal course of economic transactions 387 . Finally, legal
risk is the risk that a derivatives contract is invalid or
unenforceable 388 . The contract might be unenforceable when
the other party does not have the authority to contract or
trade the transaction. Over-the-counter derivative
instruments, rather than exchanged-traded instruments, have
generally been the focus of this risk. In addition,
reputation risk might sometimes also been involved. The
risk might exist that a bank might lose a client, or its
ability to compete effectively for new clients, due to
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perceptions that the bank does not deal fairly with clients
or that it does not know how to properly manage its
derivatives business 389 .
Finally, another potential risk stemmed from the fact
that derivative instruments were "off balance-sheet" items
that were only mentioned in footnotes to the financial
statements of firms dealing in derivatives 390 . The footnote
material provided very little data as to the amount of risk
or profits and losses from those instruments. It was at the
urging of the SEC that firms engaging in derivative
transactions have disclosed their profits and losses from
that activity391 . However, this still presents a limited
window, because not all institutions are disclosing
complete information 392 . The above risks, although defined
individually, are often realized simultaneously (i.e., risk
may be interconnected. This is particularly true when there
is a structural realignment of market prices in a given
marketplace (e.g., the September 1992 currency crisis in
the European Exchange Rate Management (ERM) system) 393 .
During such periods, there can often be a concurrent
increase in market risk, a reduction in market liquidity,
and an increase in credit risk, all of which increase
systemic risk.
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B. SPECIAL RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE USE OF
DERIVATIVES
Derivatives, however, pose other dangers based on the
magnitude and uncertainty of the repercussions. Derivatives
create the ability to realize the full profit or loss of
"owing" an asset for a fraction of the price of the
asset 394 . As derivatives are high leveraged instruments,
both buyers and sellers face substantial risks. Recall the
gold example used previously in chapter IV B (3) , in order
to enter into a contract, each party would have to put very
little money, perhaps $2,000 collateral on a contract
initially valued at $40,000. As noted in that example, a
change of $20 per ounce in the value of the underlying
asset, a mere 5% change, would result in a $2,000 profit
for one party and a $2,000 loss for the other. Assuming the
parties need only $2,000 in order to enter a contract, one
party has made a 100% return on the investment and the
other has suffered a 100% loss. If, in contrast, the
parties were required to buy 100 ounces of gold at $400 per
ounce, they would need $40,000 in capital and a $20 change
would only result in a 5% gain or loss for each party. As
mentioned earlier, derivatives may also be used to
speculate and generate large profits. Recently, derivatives
have been packaged in increasingly sophisticated forms and
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sold to and by banks, mutual funds and large corporations
as speculative instruments and not insurance tools 395 . Thus,
instead of using derivatives as a hedge to lessen risks,
banks began to invest in derivatives as a highly leveraged
play on interest rates or any other asset in order to make
a profit. Another threat that could menace the stability of
the financial system are the so-called Hedges funds. Hedges
funds are investment partnerships with fewer than 100
limited partners and are completely unregulated396 . Wealthy
individuals invest a minimum of $1 million each, which the
fund leverages by borrowing primarily from banks 397 . Without
hard numbers, observers estimate leveraging ranges from 2
to 20 times, with an average of about 10 398 . Hedges funds
came under attack in 1992 for betting big against the
European Monetary Union and the narrow Exchange Rate
Mechanism, and winning 399 .
Additionally, failure in risk monitoring, the function
that identifies, measures, monitors and reports on the
market, credit and liquidity risks incurred by the firm400
,
and deficiencies in risk management, the process within a
firm by which risk guidelines are established, allocated
and managed401 , have been leading some banks to a complete
collapse as will be illustrated in the next chapters with
the Barings PLC case. In this context, it is not surprising
to note, that while the regulators are slowly awakening
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that derivative instruments are now posing several threats
to the financial system, if for no other reason than their
size alone, derivatives have taken much criticism by the
financial press and financial specialists. Indeed, some
investors and the popular press consider that the
introduction of a futures market for a financial asset will
increase the price volatility of that financial asset in
the cash market 402 . Some market observers advocate that, as
a result of speculative trading of futures contract, the
cash market instrument does not reflect its fundamental
economic value 403 . The implication here is that the price of
the financial asset would better reflect its true economic
value in the absence of a futures market for that financial
asset 404 . Furthermore, critics assert that futures contracts
in which the underlying asset is a stock market index has
created greater volatility for stock market prices 405 . While
empirical evidence has not supported this view, the key
point is that increased volatility of stock market prices
may be due to the greater quantity and frequency of
information released by the government about important
economic indicators that affect the value of the common
stock of all companies 406 . That information itself is
subject to a great deal of variability407 . So, if there is
any observed increase in the volatility of stock prices,
that volatility may be due to the substantial variability
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of economic information, not to the presence of a futures
contract on a stock market index 408 . According to some
financial industry regulators, two "worst derivative
nightmare" 409 scenarios are of particular concern. In the
first scenario, a localized financial disaster is fomented
when bankers, using derivatives without fully understanding
their risks, deplete the capital reserves of a major bank,
thereby causing it to fail 410 . The second scenario suggest a
more devastating, potentially system-wide disaster. Here,
the interconnections created by the use of derivatives
generates a chain of obligations between financial
institutions worldwide, and a seemingly isolated failure to
meet interbank payment obligations produces a domino effect
among market dealers and participants, precipitating a
major systemic financial crisis 411 . The fear that activity
in the derivatives market could lead to a destabilization
of the U.S. (or even global market) financial system is
based on a series of factors, all of which contribute to
the potential for a large scale crisis. One important
element is the sheer size of the derivatives market 412 . The
multi-trillion dollar notional value of outstanding
derivative contracts is so large that the derivative
activities of the ten largest American commercial banks
alone amount to more than double the gross domestic product
in the United States, which in turn is "more money than all
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money in the world413 ." Of even greater concern is the fact
that the bulk of derivative dealing activity is
concentrated among a relatively small number of firms 414 .
According to the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association (ISDA) , only 150 firms were derivatives dealers
worldwide as of December 1992 415 . Furthermore, dealing
activities were concentrated among a small percentage of
these institutions 416 . The potential problem brought on by
this concentration of dealing activities is clear to both
regulators and market participants: the abrupt failure or
withdrawal from the market of even one major dealer could
seriously degrade market liquidity, undermining the
stability of numerous markets simultaneously417 . In addition
to these concerns, the financial linkage that derivatives
create among user institutions and the markets in which the
instruments are traded also contributes to the potential
for a major market meltdown 418 . Regulators feel that the
linkage element would make a financial crisis difficult to
contain if one major dealer failed to meet its
obligation 419 .
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C. REGULATORS VIEW RISKS DIFFERENTLY FOR BANKS AND
SECURITIES FIRMS
Because bank asset turnover is slow and securities
firm asset turnover is relatively high, bank risk changes
more slowly than securities risk 420 . Banks have
traditionally invested most of their funds in long-term
illiquid assets, such as loans to customers 421 . These funds
come from highly liquid customer deposits as well as
borrowings and the banks' own capital 422 . Banks have
traditionally kept these assets until maturity. As a
result, bank regulators focus on credit risk as the most
important and predominant risk. Conversely, because of
their high asset turnover, securities firms must be able to
absorb the effect of changing market values of their
portfolios as they occur 423 . Consequently, securities
regulators emphasize valuing securities positions at market
prices to provide a margin of safety against potential
losses that can be incurred as a result of market
fluctuations 424 .
CHAPTER VII:
NEED FOR REGULATORY ACTIONS
A. DERIVATIVE THREATS PROVE TO BE ALL TOO REAL
Experience proved all too soon that concerns with the
dangers presented by derivative instruments were not
entirely unwarranted425 . To cite some examples, Macy' s
defaulted on a swap contract that involved some $83 million
in interest payments 426 ; Gibson Greetings Inc. lost $19
million dollars from derivative trading427 ; Procter & Gamble
lost over $150 million from derivative trading 428 ; Orange
County in California lost $140 million429 ; A unit of
Metallgesellschaft A.G. (The German Metal and Oil company)
lost 1.37 billion dollars from mismatched derivative
transactions 430 ; Dell Computer lost 26 million dollars 431 ;
City College of Chicago has sued claiming that it was
misled in the purchase of $100 million in derivative
obligations 432 . The three biggest players in derivatives
today are New York banks: Chemical Bank, Bankers Trust and
Citicorp433 . Together these three banks are into this market
for over 6 trillion dollars, Chemical Bank alone for 2.5
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trillion dollars 434 . Following highly publicized losses at
major corporations, derivatives have come under increasing
scrutiny over the past few years.
B. INCREASED SCRUTINY OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS
The amounts of these losses are impressive and they
have not passed unnoticed by regulators, Congress and the
industry itself 435 . A number of often voluminous reports
have been published on financial derivatives and the
dangers they pose 436 . The losses incurred by some derivative
dealers have intensified congressional efforts to regulate
the rapidly growing and increasingly sophisticated
derivatives market. Banking regulators have admitted that
they do not fully understand the risks to individual banks
and the systemic risks that derivatives pose 437 . The
constant change in the value of a derivative that arises as
a result of the constant change in the value of the
underlying asset makes it very difficult for banking
regulators to determine which institutions are holding
risky derivatives 438 . Some members of the Congress believe
that, in the case of many market innovations, regulations
will not be promulgated until a crisis comes 439 . Congress
held several hearings on derivatives in 1994. Members of
the House Banking Committee expressed skepticism about the
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ability of federal agencies to regulate the fast-growing
derivatives market and suggested in 1993 that new laws may
be necessary440 . The Comptroller of the Currency, Eugene
Ludwig, agreed that current reporting requirements are not
adequate 441 . He argued that regulators are looking at ways
to require banks to reveal more information about the
impact of their activities on their earnings. The
Comptroller of the Currency directed banks under his
regulatory supervision to adopt comprehensive risk
management systems for their derivative trading 442 . He also
required banks to ensure that the derivative products they
are selling are appropriate for their customers 443 . The
Comptroller of the Currency requires banks to make sure
that they understand and can monitor and control derivative
risks 444 . The Federal Reserve Board advised its supervisory
officials that banks examinations should include a
determination of the bank maintains written policies and
procedures concerning the institution' s risk management
procedures for derivative activities 445 . Bank examiners have
also been directed to review internal control and audit
procedures for derivatives, to determine whether senior
management of the bank is evaluating regularly the
procedures to manage risk of derivative instruments and
whether management control is independent of those
conducting trading activities 446 . In addition, banks
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supervised by the Federal Reserve Board are to conduct
stress tests on their derivatives, risk taking guidelines
should be implemented, reporting systems should be in
place, credit risks should be assessed, credit limits
imposed, liquidity risks should be managed and internal
controls and audits should be in place 447 . The SEC has also
been placing pressure on firms it regulates to present more
financial information about their derivative trading
activities 448 . Members of Congress repeatedly mentioned the
complexity and size of the derivatives market. Mr. Gonsalez
said the theoretical risk of loss that some big banks face
exceeds their capital several times over 449 . A massive
report was prepared by the minority staff of the House
Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban affairs that
contained recommendations for the imposition of
strengthened regulatory standards 450 . Among other things,
these recommendations sought a strong capital requirement
to guard against risks posed by derivative instruments,
greater coordination among regulatory authorities to assure
comparable regulatory standards, enhancement of disclosure
standards for firms using derivative instruments, and
requirements for specific written policies on risk
standards that would be approved by the boards of directors
of these firms 451 . The financial industry is generally
united behind the position that the current combination of
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self-regulation and government supervision provides enough
protection against widespread losses from derivatives 452 .
However, there is a fear, in the financial industry, that
legislation would slow the development of products that are
marketed primarily as ways to hedge and reduce risk rather
than speculation453 . The FDIC is of the view that the
combination of sound institution management, market forces
and proper regulatory supervision under existing
guidelines, sharply reduces the potential of serious damage
to the banking industry454 .
Another study was also conducted by a Steering
Committee of the Group of Thirty, a private group of major
financial institutions, and expressed the view that
"derivatives by their nature do not introduce risk of a
fundamental difference or of greater scale than those
already present in the financial market 455 ." The study
asserted that "supervisory concerns can be addressed within
the present regulatory structures and approaches 456 . The
Group is of the view that "there is a danger in imposing
regulatory formulas that inhibit new product innovation or
discourage firms from developing the individualized, robust
risk management systems on which they should rely457 ." Also
the Group did note: "Because over-the-counter derivatives
are customized transactions, they often assemble risks in
complex ways. This can make the measurement and control of
103
these risks more difficult and create the possibility of
unexpected loss 456 ." The Group of Thirty study sought to
"define a set of sound risk management practices for
dealers and end-users of derivatives and instruments 459 ."
The Group also addressed the many problems encountered in
the over-the-counter market. In this regard, it made
recommendations to help those using over-the-counter
derivatives to manage their activity. These recommendations
included the following: (1) establishment of risk
management policies at the highest levels of firms on the
firms use of derivatives; (2) marking of derivatives at
their market price for risk management purposes; (3)
quantification of market risks by stimulations and
forecasting; (4) assessment of credit risks from
counterparties; (5) reduction of credit risk by master
agreements that have netting provisions; (6) establishment
of market and credit risk management functions; (7)
employment of professionals to manage derivative risks; (8)
establishment of management information systems; and (9)
adoption of accounting and disclosure practices with
greater transparency460 . Unfortunately, no consensus has yet
been reached among the industry and regulators as to what
is the appropriate regulatory model that should be applied.
Nonetheless, the number of reports on derivative
instruments along with regulatory proposals continue to
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surface because the risks posed by derivatives have been
and will continue to be substantial 461 .
C. EXISTING REGULATION
1. Guidelines of the Regulatory Banking Agencies
Financial derivatives did not begin to gain widespread
use until the early 1980s 462 . Before then, banks did not
have specific guidance from regulators with respect to
their derivative activities 463 . As a practical matter,
therefore banks' ability to engage in these activities was
subject to the general principle that those activities be
based on principles of safety and soundness 464 . As noted
earlier, Federal and State bank supervision regulators have
authority over banks' activities in derivatives as well as
traditional banks products. As derivative activity has
increased, however, regulators, both formally and
informally, have been providing guidance with respect to
the procedures banks should follow as they deal in or use
financial derivatives. The OCC published its Banking
Circular No. 79 which for several years was treated by many
banks as the principal regulatory pronouncement concerning
bank participation in derivative activities 465 . More recent
guidance was provided in late 1993 and early 1994 by the
OCC, the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC. The guidelines
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start with the premise that each bank is ultimately
responsible for understanding the risks arising from its
own derivative activities. At the same time, they include
requirements for banks trading in derivatives to confirm
the legal authority of counterparties to enter into
derivative transactions, make certain disclosures to
counterparties, and assess the appropriateness of the
derivative instruments to counterparties 466 . The ultimate
rationale for this guidance is to ensure that banks engage
in derivative activities safely and soundly by protecting
themselves from attendant credit, legal, and reputational
risks. Although the guidelines address issues of
appropriateness, they do so in the context of risk
management at the bank and do not establish suitability
standards for the protection of unsophisticated
customers 467 . They are prudential supervision examiner
guidelines, not customer protection rules. Through these
guidelines, federal agencies require banks under their
jurisdiction to establish and maintain written supervisory
policies for all derivative activities, which must be
approved by their respective boards of directors 468 . In
addition, board approval is required before any new
derivative activities may be undertaken 469 . Banking
regulators also have identified numerous areas of
fundamental risk inherent in financial derivatives. These
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include market, credit, systemic, liquidity, legal and
operational risk - all of which may be associated with non-
derivative financial instruments as well. Regulators
require banks to establish procedures to identify any other
risk associated with financial derivatives through
managerial oversight and responsibilities, risk
measurements and limits, reporting processes and
operational controls 470 . Concurrently, the regulators have
made it clear, in their recent statements, that they
recognize the benefits that financial derivatives can
confer on banks and other users, and that their regulations
are not intended to discourage the use of such products 471 .
2. Circular No. 277 of the OCC and The Federal Reserve's
Supervisory Issuance SR93-69
The Federal Reserve issued examiner guidelines for
derivatives trading activities of State member banks 472
,
which parallels provisions of the Capital Markets and
Trading Activities Manual, as well as complementary
guidelines directed at State member bank's use of off-
balance-sheet derivative instruments as end-users 473 .
The Board' s guidance instructs State member banks
engaging in derivatives trading activities, in their
evaluation of the counterparty's creditworthiness, to
consider both the counterparty's "overall financial
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strength. . . and the ability to perform on its obligation"
and its "ability to understand and manage the risks
inherent in a derivative product 474 ." Thus, banks must take
steps to "ascertain the character and financial
sophistication of counterparties", including efforts to
ensure counterparties "understand the nature and the risks"
involved in each transaction. The Board's guidance for
State member banks acting as end-users of derivatives
highlights that the end-user is responsible for
understanding and managing the risks involved in its
derivative positions, regardless of any duties the dealer
assumes. Failure to do so, through lack of internal
expertise or inadequate outside advice, constitutes an
unsafe and unsound banking practice 475 . For example, in
actively overseeing the bank's derivative activities,
directors should understand credit, market, and liquidity
risks facing the bank as a whole and its derivative
positions in particular. Further, senior management should
fully understand the bank's risk profile, even when
information and risk analyses are obtained from outside
sources, and only under specified conditions should the
bank use risk analyses supplied by their counterparties 476 .
The OCC and the Federal Reserve guidelines are
subsantively similar in their emphasis on the use of
derivative products as an appropriate risk-management
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tool 477 . One of the most telling features of the regulatory
guidelines is the recognition that derivative activities
can be beneficial to participating banking institutions in
their overall risk-management actvities 478 . The OCC has
permitted National Banks to engage in financial derivative
activities in accordance with "safe and sound practices," 479
and has put into place substantial regulations dealing with
the use of derivatives. The OCC permits a National Bank to
use derivatives for the following purposes 480 : (1) to manage
financial risk for its own account; (2) to lower its cost
of funding: (3) to exploit arbitrage opportunities across
financial markets; and (4) to engage in the trading of, and
dealing in, derivatives on behalf of customers. Financial
derivatives not only include transactions involving
interest rates, but also include transactions linked to
commodity prices, equity prices, or indexes in which all or
a portion of the return is linked to either such prices or
an index of such prices 481 . OCC Banking Circular 277
prescribes extensive guidelines covering derivative
activities, including rules regarding senior management and
board oversight of derivative activities, credit risk
management, liquidity risk management, and operations and
systems risk management 482 . The OCC bases its guidelines on
a bank' s level of activity, taking into account whether the
bank is a dealer, an active position taker, or a limited
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end-user 483 . Among the highlights of the agency guidelines
are the following484 :
1. A primary emphasis on the responsibility of a
banking institution's board of directors and senior
management to exercise adequate supervision;
2. An emphasis upon the adequacy of the institution's
internal control and reporting systems with respect to
derivative activities, and the need to identify and measure
financial risks on an individual and consolidated basis,
i.e. the need to capture a bank's consolidated risk
exposures created by derivative activities in conjunction
with other banking activities and exposures;
3. The bank's responsibility to take steps necessary
to ensure the legal enforceability of derivative contracts
with counterparties, and the advisability of using master
agreements and netting provisions to reduce, to the maximum
extent possible, net counterparty credit and other risks;
4. The obligation for the bank to maintain adequate
regulatory capital to protect against the risks associated
with these activities. Finally, insured banks also must
comply with the FDIC's guidance which focuses on end-users
derivatives 485 . It emphasizes that, regardless of the
counterparty's duties, end-users are responsible for fully
understanding a transaction' s derivative instrument and
attendant risks and have the duty to determine the
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suitability and appropriateness of their derivative
transactions. For the most part, the regulatory perspective
on bank derivative activities was that if these instruments
were used for risk-management (as opposed to speculation)
purposes, and if these activities in these instruments were
adequately supervised, they could be useful in financial
institutions' management of their funding, operational and
other banking risks 486 . The bank regulatory agencies were
principally concerned with issues such as whether such
derivative activities were permissible for the bank (in
other words, was the underlying asset a permissible
acquisition for a bank) ; whether appropriate position
limits were established; whether there existed a system for
periodic reporting to senior management on derivative
activities; whether there existed internal monitoring
systems; and whether the bank had implemented appropriate
accounting policies and procedures with respect to
derivative activities 487 . It seems that, for the regulators,
the issue today is not whether a bank may take the risk of
an activity but whether the bank manages it acceptably.
3. Regulatory Issue s When New Products Are Created
Regulation has always been a major concern when new
products are created. It is often unclear whether a product
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comes under existing regulations, and which agency should
regulate it 488 . If the product does not fall under current
regulations, concerns are raised about whether an
unregulated product should be permitted489 . For many years
the over-the-counter market, which largely consisted of the
interbank market for foreign currency, was unregulated at
the Federal level 490 . Most of the participants were banks,
whose activities were monitored by the appropriate bank
regulatory agency. As more over-the-counter products were
created, concerns were raised, especially by exchanges 491 .
They argued that since these unregulated over-the-counter
products competed with their products, it gave an unfair
advantage to the over-the-counter products 492 . Indeed, an
unregulated market has more flexibility to respond to
changing conditions and does not incur the same level of
legal and administrative costs 493 . As noted earlier, banks
who are dealing derivatives are subject to regulation by
the appropriate bank regulatory authority who will pay
considerable attention to the derivative activities. Banks
are required to maintain capital in proportion to the risk
of their activities. The regulation that applies to new
products depends on the type of derivative instrument and
counterparty involved. In general, the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 apply to
derivatives that have securities as underlying asset 494 . The
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Securities and Exchange Commission regulates the trades and
the brokers 495 . Other levels of regulation are imposed by
the Federal Reserve System, which regulates the extension
of margin credit 496 ; the Securities Investor Protection
Corporation, which provides insurance against the failure
of brokerage firms 497 ; and the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) , of which most firms involved in
options trading are members 498 . Many new exchange-traded
option products were introduced in the 1980s, including
options on stock indexes, options on foreign currencies,
and options on futures 499 . These products created some
confusion as to whether the Securities and Exchange
Commission of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission had
regulatory purview. The options on futures instrument
caused the greatest confusion because it is like an option
and a futures. In an important step in resolving the
matter, the SEC and CFTC reached an agreement whereby the
SEC would regulate options on stocks, stock indexes, and
foreign currencies while the CFTC would govern options on
all futures contracts 500 . According to the agreement, a CFTC
regulated contract cannot permit delivery of instruments
regulated by the SEC 501 . Although this agreement was a
turning point in regulatory cooperation, continued disputes
between the SEC and CFTC characterized the regulatory
environment of the early 1990s 502 . The Commodities Exchange
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Act of 1936 applies to derivatives that are commodities and
the CFTC ( Commodity Futures Trading Commission) regulates
futures commissions merchants, floor brokers and traders.
Futures and commodity options, including options on
government securities, futures, and stock indices, are
within the jurisdiction of the CFTC 503 . Options on
securities, including on common stock and government debt,
options on foreign currency when traded on exchanges, and
stock indices, are within the SEC's jurisdiction 504 .
4. Regulation in the OTC Market
One of the difficulties in analyzing the regulatory
treatment of OTC derivatives is that the term itself is not
defined in any of the securities laws, including the
governing statute, the Investment Company Act of 1940 505 .
The Over-the-Counter derivatives have presented challenges
in defining the legal relationship between the
counterparties, which is presumed to be arm's-length, and
respective duties of the financial intermediary and end-
user. While all futures and many option contracts are
standardized and traded on exchanges subject to the SEC's
or CFTC s jurisdiction, swaps, forwards, many options
contracts and other derivatives that are individually
negotiated and traded in the OTC market are not subject to
Federal securities or commodities laws, including their
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anti-fraud provisions 506 . Banks engaging in OTC derivative
transactions are not subject to "know your customer" or
suitability rules of self-regulatory organizations ("SROs")
under the SEC s jurisdiction nor to the CFTC's disclosure
rules 507 . The General Accounting Office ("GAO") has
identified three major types of OTC derivatives: forwards,
options and swaps 506 . In the U.S., one principal regulation
of OTC derivatives arises out of bank capital adequacy
regulation 509 . In addition however, state insurance company
regulators and Federal securities and commodities
regulatory agencies have issued statements and regulations
that affect derivative market participants 510 .
Over the past few years, investment companies incurred
serious losses arising from investments in OTC
derivatives 511 . Some of the most notable losses involved
swaps and structured notes that lost value as interest
rates moved sharply upward in 1994 512 .
Market data demonstrate that derivative instruments
represent a limited portion of investment companies' total
assets and that investment companies have been only
marginal players in the derivative markets 513 .
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a. The Regulatory Policy Underlying the Investment
Company Act
Investment companies are financial intermediaries that
sell shares to the public and invest the proceeds in a
diversified portfolio of securities 514 . Each share sold
represents a proportionate interest in the portfolio of
securities managed by the investment company on behalf of
the companies' shareholders 515 . There are different types of
investment companies such as mutual funds and close-end
funds. A mutual fund is an open-end investment company that
is subject to a continuing obligation to redeem its shares
on demand at a price equal to an appropriate share of the
value of its portoflio, which is computed daily at the
close of the market 516 . Unlike mutual funds, close-end funds
sell shares like any other corporation but usually do not
redeem their shares 517 . All investment companies are
regulated at the federal level according to the Investment
Company Act of 1940 and subsequent amendments to that
legislation 518 . The securities they issue must be registered
with the SEC 519 . The regulatory policy underlying the
Investment Company Act has been that investment companies
generally should be free to fashion their own investment
strategies and objectives with a few restrictions/ as long
as their provide full and accurate disclosure to
investors 520 . This regulatory approach allows professional
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investment managers to offer their clients a wide choice of
collective investment vehicles (e.g., money market funds,
long-term bond funds, equity funds, growth funds, index
funds, asset allocation funds) covering the spectrum of
risk and price volatility521 .
b. The Treatment of Derivatives under the Investment
Company Act
The ICI requires every investment company to recite in
its registration statement, which contains the prospectus,
its fundamental investment policies 522 . The prospectus must
contain language clearly indicating that the investment
company may utilize particular types of derivatives 523 . The
Securities and Exchange Commission also requires a firm to
disclose in its prospectus the risks of derivative
trading 524 . The SEC has required, for example, that
investment companies disclose that options and futures may
fail as hedging transactions if there is basis risk between
the underlying position and the derivative position525 .
Additional risk disclosure requirements focus on
revealing the unpredictability of stock prices, interest
rates, and other economic factors, and the risk that a fund
may not be able to close out its position if a liquid
secondary market does not exist for a given derivative 526 .
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The SEC stated that "if more than five percent of an
investment company' s assets are at risk from its
involvement in derivative instruments and derivative-based
transactions"/ the company's prospectus should address, (i)
the types of derivative transactions in which the company
might engage, (ii) the characteristics of those
transactions, (iii) the purposes for which derivatives will
be used, and (iv) the risks posed by such transactions 527 .
In keeping with the ICI disclosure philosophy , the SEC
endorsed the idea that funds should be required to quantify
the level of risk in their portfolios 528 . Improved
disclosure related to derivatives must focus on the
distinct risks that particular types of derivatives might
pose 529 . The SEC did not impose restrictions on the use of
derivatives by investment companies, concluding that
derivatives are not inherently risky and may actually
reduce portfolio risk in certain circumstances. The ICA
regulation, however, imposes restrictions on leverage.
Section 18 (a) of the ICA prohibits a close-end fund from
issuing any class of "senior security" unless immediately
thereafter the fund has an asset coverage of at least
300% 530 . The SEC considers leverage to be present in any
transaction that may cause a fund to have future payment
obligations or risk of loss exceeding its initial
investment 531 . The SEC has taken the view that the leverage
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restrictions apply to certain derivative transactions that
expose a fund to future contingent payment or delivery
obligations (e.g. swaps, futures and short options
positions) 532 . Derivatives, under this view, are clearly
within the scope of the ICA' s senior security restrictions.
The reason is that these types of derivative
instruments in effect subordinate the shareholders' claims
to the fund's assets to the claims of the fund's
counterparties in the derivative transactions 533 . Finally,
under the SEC guidelines, mutual funds may not invest more
than 15% of their net assets in '"illiquid assets." 534 The
SEC views an illiquid asset as "any asset which may not be
sold or disposed of in the ordinary course of business
within seven days at approximately the value at which the
mutual fund has valued the investment." 535 This restriction
is designed to ensure that mutual funds maintain sufficient
liquidity to meet their obligations to redeem fund shares
on demand536 . Thus, funds investing in OTC derivatives must
factor these investments into their calculation of overall
portfolio liquidity. Investement companies should generally
assume that OTC derivatives are illiquid, given their
privately negotiated character and their customized
terms 537 .
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D. THE FAILURE OF BARINGS BANK
1. The Facts
The oldest British Merchant Bank, Baring Brothers,
collapsed over the weekend of February 25-26, 1995. A 28
year-old employee based in Singapore and trading futures
and options contracts for the Barings group (he traded
futures on the SIMEX - Singapore International Monetary
Exchange) had accumulated losses exceeding £860 million536 .
Barings' capital was £540 million. A rescue effort by the
Bank of England failed: other banks would not lend to
Barings because with derivative contracts still open, the
full extent of Barings' losses could not be fixed 539 . On
March 5, the Dutch "Bank Internationale Nederlanden Groep
NV" (ING Bank) won the bid to acquire Barings' securities
for £1, it being understood that ING had to assume most
debts, evaluated at that time around £660 million 540 . On
March 8, the acquisition was approved by the U.K. High
Court and by the Court in the Cayman Islands, where Barings
was incorporated541 .
2. The Cause of the Collapse
What Barings' broker did was holding many billions of
dollars in unhedged positions in futures and options on the
Nikkei 225 stock index (which is an index based on a
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portfolio of 225 stocks listed on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange) , interest rate futures on Japanese Government
bonds and Futures on TOPIX, the index of all equities
traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange 542 . Leeson got into
trouble buying and selling "straddle" futures tied to the
level of Japan's Nikkei 225 stock index, "betting", in
effect, that the market level would stay within a certain
trading range. But on January 17, 1995, an earthquake
struck the city of Kobe, causing the Nikkei to tumble and
Leeson' s losses to mount 543 . In spite of the falling index,
Leeson was confident the market would soon stabilize,
buying thousands of additional derivative contracts in a
desperate "double-or-nothing" style bet 544 . While, on
January 1995 he was trading 2,187 contracts, he reported
trading 16,937 contracts one month later 545 . The Singapore
Authorities asked the Barings bank to justify the large
mushrooming positions. Why so many contracts in a short
period of time? Leeson told the Barings' group that it was
for customers who had called him. But, in reality, it was
not. Barings headquarters thought Leeson was arbitraging 546 .
SIMEX seemed to have not limited Barings to some maximum
number of contracts because of Barings reputation and
because it kept meeting the margin calls 547 . To cover up his
positions within Barings, Leeson represented some as being
for customers and the other as fully hedged 548 . In early
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March 1995, the Singapore government reported evidence that
Barings' broker forged letters to indicate some positions
were for customers 549 . For fictitious customers, he had to
meet margin calls and to pay commissions. To do so, he used
an account he had set up in 1992 for his own undisclosed
personal trading 550 . In early 1995, he funded this account
with receipts from selling options, but the account ran out
of money on January 22 551 . Leeson then, asked Barings London
for margin money. By this point, Barings must have known of
large proprietary positions, which its senior management
said they thought were hedged552 . To fund as much as $900
million in margin calls, Barings turn to banks in the UK,
US and Japan 553 . According to one Singapore trader:
"Ultimately, if you want to cover up something, it is not
that difficult... Derivative positions change all the time
and balance sheets do not give a proper picture of what is
going on. For anyone on the outside to keep track is
virtually impossible.
"
554 Others appalled that Barings
allowed Leeson both to trade and to manage settlement 555 .
Thanks to the take-over by ING bank the systemic risk and
ripple effect beyond Barings was minor.
3. The Legitimate Questions
Everyone associated with banking had to have been
stunned by this failure. How could Leeson' s exposure have
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gone undiscovered for so long? How were the massive losses
incurred? And why was the true position not notice earlier?
The losses were incurred by reason of unauthorized and
concealed trading activities within BFS (Baring Futures
Singapore) 556 . The true position was not noticed earlier by
reason of a serious failure of controls and managerial
confusion within Barings, nor had it been detected by the
external auditors, supervisors or regulators of Barings 557 .
How concerned should bank regulators be about the role of
Barings bank in the events leading to the crisis ? Is this
a matter of better prudential regulation or does it suggest
that deposit -taking institutions should be separated from
securities and derivative activities? Debate rages between
those worried about the systemic dangers posed by
derivative markets and those who ridicule the worriers.
Many people, including the US congressmen, believe the
problem is big 556 . The complexity eludes the senior managers
who are supposed to evaluate the systems and the risks, but
must instead rely on traders themselves, exposing the firm
to possible fraud559 . On Friday, December 1, 1995, Nick
Leeson pleaded guilty to two offenses of deceiving the
auditors of Barings in a way likely to cause harm to their
reputation and to cheating SIMEX 560 . The following day,
Saturday December 2, Nick Leeson was sentenced to six and a
half years in prison 561 . He is currently serving his
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sentence in Changi, Singapore. The collapse of Barings is
one of the most spectacular debacles in modern financial
history. If a kid, playing on the other side of the world,
could destroy a 240 year-old bank that had financed the
Napoleonic Wars and that counted the Queen among its
current clients, how safe are investors and depositors
anywhere? The Barings broker dealt with losses and avoided
detection. The story reveals an amazing chain of human
errors. This crisis raises important issues concerning the
regulation of futures and options markets. Not only
derivatives were the cause of the collapse but also
mismanagement, fraud or conspiracy were involved in this
case. Right or wrong, one conclusion that could be drawn
without any doubt is that those who sat on the board of
Barings emerge from this story as sublime incompetents for
not having exercised the minimum duty of care that they
should have exercised.
This story points certainly to the core issue in an
age of derivatives and Electronic finance or
"cyberbanking", i.e, the ability of banks and non-bank
entities to gather, transfer, store money through
mechanisms outside of the bank regulatory framework. Can
the bank regulatory structure rely for the protection of
the system on internal controls and the conscientiousness
of bankers to control these risks, incurred at these
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speeds? And what if it cannot? And can it rely on them for
the protection of the federal deposit insurance funds?
Unfortunately, Barings' case is not the only one. This
year, a Japanese company, the Sumitomo Corp., a top general
trade house, reported losses totaling $1.8 billion from its
top traders' trading of physical copper and copper-related
derivative instruments over ten years 562 .
E. RECENT LITIGATION CASES - ON TRIAL FOR DANGEROUS
DEALING
1. Introduction
While there have been numerous reports of losses,
which illustrate problems with internal control and risk
management, the most significant litigation so far has
raised suitability questions. Additionally, in numerous
cases, the excessive losses occurred when investment
strategies utilized derivatives to "bet" that interest
rates would stay low. When interest rates began to rise,
these strategies failed. Since the dealers of derivatives
is, in most instances, the more sophisticated party with
respect to the function of risks associated with
derivatives, it is the investor who is often left out of
the loop when it comes to understanding derivative
transactions 563 . It is for this reason - the lack of
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sophistication of the consumer - that disclosure of
derivatives related risks by dealers is so important. At
present, there are no mandatory regulatory or industry
standards requiring dealers to evaluate their customer'
s
capacity to understand the risks inherent in the use of
derivatives in an investment portfolio 564 . As a result, many
customers invest funds with little understanding of what
derivatives are and how they work. Moreover, in the case of
the individual putting private money in a purportedly safe
investment, such as money market or mutual fund, there may
be no knowledge that fund managers are even using
derivatives 565 .
2. Suitabi lity duties imposed on broker-dealers
In general, a broker-dealer may recommend a security
to a retail customer only if the broker-dealer obtains
information regarding the customer's financial
circumstances and investment objectives and, on the basis
of this information, determines that the security is
suitable for the customer 566 . Suitability rules are
enforceable against members of Self Regulatory
Organizations through censure, fines, suspension,
expulsion, and other disciplinary sanctions available under
rules of Self Regulatory Organizations 567 . A broker-dealer's
violation of the NYSE's "Know your customer" rule or the
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NASD' s suitability rule generally will not entitle the
customer to bring a civil claim for damages against that
broker-dealer 568 . However, violations of the NASD and NYSE
rules may be actionable under the anti-fraud provisions of
Federal or State securities laws 569 . For instance, under
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act 570 , implemented through
the SEC s Rule 10b-5 571 , a customer may recover damages of
the broker-dealer engaged in fraudulent sales practices in
connection with the unsuitable transaction, such as making
a material misrepresentation or omission with respect to a
security that the broker-dealer knew or, but for his or her
reckless conduct, would have known, was unsuitable for the
customer 572 . There is no common law cause of action for a
broker-dealer's failure to make a suitability determination
absent an advisory agreement or assumption by the broker-
dealer of duties to the customer other than merely taking
orders 573 . Without an advisory agreement as a basis for a
breach of contract claim, when a special relationship of
trust and confidence exists between the broker-dealer and
the customer, the broker's investment in unsuitable
securities for the customer may constitute a breach of
fiduciary duty or negligence 574 .
In the banking area, banking regulators have imposed
less stringent requirements on the basis that most bank
derivative dealers have institutional customers that do not
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need retail customer protection. The OCC require only that
before entering into any derivative transaction with a
customer, a bank determine whether the proposed transaction
is consistent with the customer' s policies and procedures
with respect to derivative activities, as they are known to
the bank. An examination of some of the more prominent
derivatives-related debacles follows.
a. The Bankers Trust Case
The Bankers Trust settlements arose from a series of
leveraged interest rate swaps that BT entered into with
Gibson Greetings Inc. and Procter & Gamble from 1991 to
1993. An interest rate swap is an agreement by two
"counterparties" to pay each other the amount of interest
each owes on a specified amount, called the "notional
amount 575 . " Typically, one counterparty must make floating
interest rate payments, while the other is required to make
fixed payments. In the Procter & Gamble case, one contract
was a so called 5-30 swap, under which Procter & Gamble was
to pay a fixed rate tied to the five-year US Treasury note
and the 30-year Treasury bond and receive a floating rate
tied to the commercial paper rate 576 . The second swap, a so-
called Deutschemark swap, was tied to German interest
rates 577 . Many of the BT's swaps were leveraged so that the
swaps' value changed dramatically with relatively small
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changes in market interest rates. They also were over-the-
counter derivatives that were customized, privately
negotiated and not traded on any market. BT, like most
derivative dealers, guarded its assumptions and
methodologies for valuing swaps linked to interest rates
and other indices as proprietary trade secrets 578 . When
interest rates rose in 1993, Procter & Gamble's and
Gibson's leveraged swaps plummeted in value and both
terminated their swap agreement and separately brought suit
against BT 579 . Both companies claimed that they lacked
access to BT' s computer models for predicting interest rate
changes, which BT regarded as proprietary. They also
claimed that they could not evaluate their derivative
holdings and alleged that BT had misrepresented materially
the risks attendant to investing in derivatives 580 .
After these suits were filed, the Federal Reserve, the
CFTC and the SEC commenced separate investigations of BT.
In December 1994, the Federal Reserve announced a
settlement with BT, requiring the company to disclose to
leveraged derivative customers, among other things, "the
methodology for making valuation adjustments'' and "the
analytical foundation for the valuation adjustment
methodology. 581 " Two weeks later, the SEC and CFTC issued
their own settlement orders with BT. BT did not admit to
any fraud, but the orders stated that BT had violated
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statutory reporting and anti-fraud provisions in connection
with the Gibson swaps and required BT to "cease and desist"
violating the commodities and securities laws 582 . Until
today, federal regulators have avoided establishing
suitability policy for derivatives but by reciting that
BT' s alleged misconduct consisted of making material
misrepresentations and omissions, the CFTC and SEC
settlements may presage the regulators' use of a previously
unrecognized theory of liability583 . Also it has left the
market somewhat concerned as to whether it acts as a
precedent 584 . Those new rules will probably prompt all
reporting companies using derivatives to disclose their
current market values. Such rules could put more pressure
on derivative dealers not only to perform the valuation
function for their clients, but also to describe the
assumptions and methodologies behind the valuations. The
CFTC and SEC ordered Bankers Trust recently to pay a $10
million fine to settle securities and commodities law
violations based on misrepresentation and omissions made to
Gibson Greetings 585 . The CFTC agreement also established
that BT "became a commodity trading advisor" with a
fiduciary obligation to Gibson586 .
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b. The Procter & Gamble Case
Procter & Gamble sued Bankers Trust because they had
suffered heavy losses due to unsuitable trades in Swaps.
The law suit which was filed in 1994 had asked the District
Court of Ohio to declare a swap transaction void, and had
sought $130 million in compensatory damages against Bankers
Trust 587 . Procter & Gamble had also asked for an unspecified
amount of punitive damages. Procter & Gamble had charged
that Bankers Trust did not fully and accurately disclose
information on the terms and risks of an interest-rate swap
designed for Procter & Gamble 588 . Bankers Trust claimed that
Procter & Gamble losses came because of market risks that
the company knowingly took through a transaction that it
fully understood and approved 589 . The suit charges in part
that the consumer product giant relied on BT as a fiduciary
advisor for complex derivatives 590 . Bankers Trust and
Procter & Gamble Co. reached on May 9, 1996 an agreement
settling a two-year-old dispute between the two
companies 591 .
c. Orange County Case
Municipalities an other investors of public funds are
also subject to investor risk when derivatives are used.
Local boards are often composed of prominent citizens who,
though well respected in their community, lack the
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financial expertise needed to properly manage risk 59-. Nor
are pension fund boards or municipalities likely to have
access to the sophisticated computer hardware and software
dealers employ to evaluate risk 593 . Compounding these
investment risks is the pressure for fund managers to show
an impressive return on investment 594 . This pressure leads
fund managers to move toward increasingly riskier and less
well understood investments and the result, as witnessed
recently in Orange County/ may be disastrous 595 . In December
of 1994, Orange County, California sent shock waves through
the U.S. financial markets. With its $7.4 billion
investment fund facing losses of $1.5 billion/ the county
filed for bankruptcy, the largest such filing ever by a
municipality596 . Under the supervision of County Treasurer
Robert L. Citron, the County's funds were used in a highly
leveraged investment strategy that attempted to use
interest-sensitive derivative contracts to boost the funds
yield597 . In the beginning, Citron's fund, which offered a
return of between seven and eight percent annually, was an
attractive investment to recession-ridden local governments
and public entities whose primary alternative was a
conservative state-run fund paying around four percent per
year 598 . Taking in approximately $7.5 billion from nearly
200 local governments and agencies, Citron then borrowed
aggressively, bringing the value of the investment pool to
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$20 billion 599 . This money was then invested in volatile
structured notes issued by quasi-governmental agencies like
the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) and
Federal Home Loan Banks, which effectively leveraged the
entire pool by a factor of three 600 . Citron planned to earn
around five percent in his base investment, and secure an
enhanced yield on the leveraged portion of the fund (around
$ 14 billion) based on the difference between what the
bonds paid (five percent) and the cost of financing them
(three percent) 601 . Unfortunately for Citron, his strategy
relied on a bet that interest would stay low; most of the
funds derivatives were inverse floaters, instruments whose
yields move counter to market interest rates 602 . The
strategy paid well while rates remained low, but when rates
climbed, Citron's portfolio began to earn below market
rates, forcing Citron to pay more on the money he had
borrowed than his fund could now earn 603 . When the Federal
Reserve raised the discount rate, Citron's pool could no
longer sustain the cost of the leveraged portion of its
fund, and shortly thereafter the county filed for
bankruptcy protection 604 . In aftermath of the collapse, some
critics have blamed Citron' s management strategy and lack
of expertise rather than the financial instruments used605 .
Other commentators have claimed that the lesson of the
Orange County debacle is not that a fund manager used risky
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derivatives to boost investment earnings, but rather that
public funds, which were thought by most county taxpayers
to be invested conservatively, were in fact being put at
great risk in speculative trading 006 .
d. Metallgesellschaft case
One of the highest profile derivatives-induced
disasters occurred at Metallgesellschaft, Germany's
fourteenth-largest industrial corporation, whose subsidiary
MG Corp. had estimated losses for 1993 of at least $500
million 607 . Over the course of several years, MG entered
into a series of long-term, fixed-price contracts, agreeing
to supply petroleum products to various counterparties 608 .
The subsidiary failed, however, to negotiate agreements to
buy oil products in an amount sufficient to fulfill the
supply contracts, leaving the subsidiary vulnerable to
fluctuations in the price of oil for at least some portion
of the amount of product it had contracted to supply to its
counterparties 609 . MG then purchased oil derivatives
contracts both on the OTC market and through organized
exchanges, the strategy being that an expected rise in the
price of oil would create profits through the derivatives
which would offset the losses MG would take buying high-
priced oil to fulfill its supply contract obligations 610 .
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Unfortunately, the attempted hedge was improperly
planned, and the derivatives MG purchased were suitable
hedges only for short-term oil price fluctuations 611 . When
the spread between the long and short-term price of oil
increased, the derivatives MG purchased as protection ended
up costing the company a very big loss 612 .
CHAPTER VIII:
CURRENT U.S. BANK SUPERVISORY INITIATIVES:
HOW TO LASSO THE DERIVATIVE BEAST?
A. CHANGING FINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT
The events of the past several years, have
qualitatively changed the level of regulatory interest in
derivative activities, as commercial banks have become
primarily (if not principal) participants in the domestic
and international swaps, futures, options and other
derivatives markets 613 . This increase in participation,
coupled with the fact that there is no organized regulatory
structure for many of the most active derivative markets,
have led to calls by Congress and some of the regulatory
agencies, including the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
,
for assurances that bank involvement in these markets is
prudent and consistent with the interests of other market
participants, and does not unduly jeopardize bank
depositors interests 614 . Because derivative activities are
not subject to consolidated supervision and regulation, and
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because they take place in a variety of exchange and OTC
market environments, the concerns over the potential risks
associated with these markets has been tempered by the
recognition that any attempt to regulate these markets in a
consolidated fashion may interfere with their efficient
functioning and deprive participants of their important
risk-management benefits 615 .
B. PROPOSED REGULATION OF BANKS' DERIVATIVE ACTIVITIES
1. New Requirements Adopted by the Federal Reserve,
the QCC and the FDIC
Although banking regulators are aware that additional
regulation is required in order to reduce risk exposure in
derivatives, they have urged Congress not to further
regulate derivative activities 616 . Indeed, regulators fear
that increased regulation "could be more hurtful than
helpful." 617 The regulatory response to the increased use of
derivatives by banks has been moderate. Instead of
prohibiting or restricting banks' use of derivatives,
banking regulators have responded by amending their risk
based capital standards to ensure that banks engaging in
derivative activities have sufficent capital 618 . The new
requirements are based upon the July 15, 1994 proposed
revisions to the Agreement on International Convergence of
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Capital Measurement and Capital Standards of July 1988
("Basle Accord") 619 and have been adopted by the Federal
Reserve Board620 , the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency621 , the Office of Thrift Supervision 622 and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 623 . Thus, national
banks, state member banks, state non-member banks and bank
holding companies will all be subject to essentially the
same regulations 624 . The changes will be twofold: they will
amend risk based capital standards to account for off-
balance-sheet items such as derivatives and they will
recognize bilateral agreements for purposes of such
accounting 625 .
a. Proposed Changes to Risk Based Capital Standards
As mentioned earlier, risk based capital standards
prescribe the amount of capital that banks must hold
depending upon the risks embodied in their assets and off-
balance-sheet items 626 . The proposed rules account for
derivatives by converting them into credit equivalent
amounts, multiplying the credit equivalent amount by a
weighting factor (which presumably would depend on the
creditworthiness of the obligor), and increasing the bank's
capital requirements by the product 627 . The credit
equivalent of an off-balance-sheet derivative is the sum of
two components: a bank's current exposure and its potential
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exposure 626 . The current exposure is closely related to the
market value of a derivative 625 . For example, if Bank A
enters into a derivative agreement with Bank B in which
Bank B owes Bank A $100,000, Bank A' s current exposure is
$100,000 because it is the amount that Bank A would lose if
Bank B defaulted. Bank B, on the other, would not have any
current exposure because it loses nothing if Bank A
defaults. Potential exposure is calculated by multiplying
the notional principal amount of the underlying contract by
a conversion factor 630 . The conversion factor derives its
value from two components: the type of contract and
duration of the contract 631 . The first component of the
conversion factors is the asset underlying a derivative
contract 632 . The new regulations create five categories of
derivative contracts 633 . There are, in order of increasing
conversion factors: (1) interest rate; (2) foreign exchange
rate; (3) gold; (4) equity precious metal and (5) other
commodities 634 . Interest rate derivatives have been assigned
to the lowest conversion factors, and thus, are subject to
the lower capital requirements; derivatives based on "other
commodities'' have been assigned the highest conversion
factors and thus, are subject to the highest capital
requirements 635 . The second component of the conversion
factor is the length of the derivative contract 636 . Longer
contracts are subject to higher conversion factors 637 . Thus,
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a derivative contract with a remaining maturity of one year
will be subject to lower conversion factors than a
corresponding contract with a maturity over five years 638 .
After determining the appropriate conversion factor,
the bank or regulator may calculate the potential exposure
of a derivative contract by multiplying the notional value
of the contract by the conversion factor 639 . The credit
equivalent amount of a derivative contract is the sum of
its current exposure and its potential exposure 640 . Once the
credit equivalent amount is calculated, capital adequacy
requirements are derived by multiplying the credit
equivalent amount by the weighting factor assigned to the
counterparty641 . The Federal Reserve, in conjunction with
the OCC and FDIC adopted a rule effective September 1, 1995
that revises the risk-based capital guidelines to include
explicit consideration of bank's exposure to declines in
the economic value of their capital due to changes in
interest-rate 642 . The guidelines will now act to ensure that
banks have sufficient capital on hand to cover potential
losses incurred due to interest-rate risk exposure. The
final rule does not establish thresholds above which a
bank's interest-rate exposure is considered too high 643 .
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b. Recognition of Bilateral Netting Agreements
Bilateral netting agreement is an agreement under
which two parties who have entered into multiple
transactions agree to satisfy their obligations to each
other on an aggregated basis, netting out the respective
amounts owed to each other in the various transactions 644 .
Although, netting typically occurs in the designated
payment date, it may occur during a "close out''. Market
values are netted to calculate a single net termination
amount 645 . Because the use of netting in the context of a
close-out is not recognized as legally enforceable under
the bankruptcy laws of all countries, there exists a risk
that a counterparty may be unable to net market values at
termination. As long as netting at close-out is not
recognized as legally enforceable, capital adequacy based
on a net position would underestimate the credit exposure
of the banking organization counterparty of the
derivative 646 . If netting is recognized as legally
enforceable at close-out, then banking organization that
are parties to netting agreements can maintain capital
based on their net rather than gross position. The proposed
rules would recognize bilateral netting agreements for
purposes of risk-based capital standards, potentially
reducing the current exposure of banks that have entered
into multiple derivative transactions with a single
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counterparty 64
"
7
. To illustrate , assume that Bank A and Bank
B enter into five derivative contracts with each other.
Bank A owes Bank B $100,000 on contract one, $100,000 on
contract two, and $100,000 on contract three. Bank B owes
Bank A $100,000 on contract four and $100,000 on contract
five. Before bilateral netting agreements were recognized,
Bank A would have a current exposure of $200,000 (the
amount that Bank A would lose if Bank B defaulted) and Bank
B would have a current exposure of $300,000. Bilateral
netting agreements allow banks to net out their differences
with a counterparty646 . Thus, under the proposed rule, Bank
B would have a current exposure of $100,000 and Bank A
would have no current exposure. In order to qualify for
special treatment, a bank must show that it has a legally
enforceable bilateral netting agreement 649 . Under such an
agreement, the market value of all derivative contracts
among the parties are added together to produce one net
current exposure 650 . This protects a party that has not
defaulted against a party that has defaulted. To
illustrate, suppose that Bank A files bankruptcy. Bank A
would refuse to pay Bank B yet it could demand that Bank B
pay it under the contracts. Under such a scenario, Bank B
would have to pay Bank A $200,000 while also suffering a
total loss of $300,000 on the other contract with Bank A.
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be required to pay Bank A anything. Proof of a legally
enforceable bilateral agreement would be made by obtaining
a written legal opinion certifying the validity of the
opinion 651 . In addition to these changes, the regulatory
agencies issued special guidelines addressing the concerns
related to derivative instruments. The Federal Reserve, in
conjunction with the OCC and FDIC, has recently amended its
risk-based capital guidelines for State Member banks 652 and
Bank Holding Companies 653 to recognize for derivative
contracts the effects of netting arrangements in the
calculation of potential future risk exposure. The only
netting agreement recognized by the Capital Adequacy
Guidelines is netting by novation 654 . Netting by novation
involves a contract under which all obligations between the
same two parties for the same currency and value date are
combined, with the result that one single net amount is
legally substituted for all of the previous obligations 655 .
Netting by novation is recognized because it is the only
form of netting the Basle Supervisors' Committee determined
to be legally enforceable under bankruptcy laws of all
members countries. Under the amendments, institutions are
required to have reasoned legal opinions concluding that
bilateral netting agreements are legally enforceable in all
relevant jurisdictions 656 . As a result, banks using eligible
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derivatives are allowed to hold less capital against future
credit exposure.
2. Guidelines Issued by the Federal Regulatory Agencies
a. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System
The Federal Reserve issued guidelines for examiners on
"Examining Risk Management and Internal Controls for
Trading Activities of Banking Organizations" 657 and the
Capital Markets and Trading Activities Manual 658 . The
Trading Activities Examiner Guidelines, which parallel
provisions of the Trading Activities Manual, target
trading, market-making, and customer-accommodation
activities in cash and derivative instruments at State
member banks, branches and agencies of foreign banks, and
Edge corporations 659 . Principles of the Trading Activities
Examiner Guidelines also apply to risk management of bank
holding companies on a consolidated basis and can be
applied to banks' use of derivatives as end-users when
appropriate. Also, the Federal Reserve issued complementary
examiner guidelines, specifically applicable to these
institutions' end-user derivative activities, entitled
"Evaluating the Risk Management and Internal Controls of
Securities and Derivative Contracts Used in Nontrading
Activities," 660 . Most recently, the Federal Reserve also
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issued examiner guidelines entitled "Rating the Adequacy of
Risk Management Processes and Internal Controls at State
Member Banks and Bank Holding Companies.'' 661 The following
summary is of significant provisions of both the Trading
and Nontrading Activities Examiner Guidelines related to
derivative activities.
a.l) Trading Activities Examiner Guidelines and
Trading Activities Manual
a.l) a- Provisions on customer appropriateness: the
purpose of the provisions is to protect the bank from
credit risk, legal risk and risk of loss of its
reputation662 . In this regard, a bank must ensure that the
counterparty has sufficient authority to enter into a
derivatives transaction. In order to determine whether or
not a company, a municipality do have the statutory
authority to enter into these transactions, the bank should
look to authorizations of boards of directors or
trustees 663 . Also the bank must take steps to ascertain the
character and financial sophistication of the counterparty,
including ensuring that the counterparty understands the
nature of and the risks inherent in the agreed
transaction 664 . If the counterparty is unsophisticated, the
bank must take additional steps to ensure that the
counterparty is made aware of attendant risks 665 . In its
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evaluation of the counterparty's creditworthiness, the bank
should consider, in addition to the counterparty' s overall
financial strength and ability to perform on its
obligation, the counterparty's ability to understand and
manage the risks inherent in a derivative product 666 .
a.l)b- Provisions on netting agreements: the banks
should have guidelines and rules in place to determine
enforceability of netting agreements before consummating a
transaction 667 . Banks should determine the enforceability of
netting agreements in all relevant jurisdictions,
notwithstanding the counterparty's insolvency668 .
a.l)c- Provisions on board of directors and management
oversight: Risk-taking activities of an institution should
be governed by policies approved by the board of directors.
The board of directors regularly should be informed of risk
exposure an risk management issues 669 . Further, senior
management should oversee trading operations and ensure
that relevant policies and procedures are adequate. In
addition, in order to avoid fraud or conspiracy, management
must create a risk management function that is fully
independent of trading management 670 . The objective is to
ensure that the board of directors provides the policies
and guidance and exercises the overall supervision
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requisite to management's operation of the bank's
derivatives business effectively and in a safe and sound
manner, while leaving to management responsibility for day-
to-day operations and operational oversight 671 . The risk
management function should report trading risks, profits,
and losses at least daily to managers who supervise but do
not conduct themselves trading activities 672 . The personnel
staffing this function should understand the risks
associated with derivatives and their compensation should
not be tied too closely to the profitability of trading, in
order to avoid potential incentives for excessive risk-
taking 673 .
a.l)d- Provisions on risk management
- Accounting issues: Banks should have the ability to
mark-to-market derivatives and all other trading position
on a daily basis 674 . As long as reliable market value can be
obtained, it is possible to simply record the transaction
as either an asset or liability675 . Mark-to-market
accounting has long been used by banks, investment firms,
and mutual funds to value their securities portfolios.
In Japan, after the Sumitomo loss in 1996, the
Ministry of Finance decided to require that banks and
securities companies start using the mark-to-market
accounting method676 . Currently, the non financial Japanese
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companies can use the lower-cost accounting method which
enables a company to book its asset values at the time of
purchase, regardless of current or real value of such
assets. With this method, the asset's value will be either
what the firm paid for it or what it is currently worth on
the market, whichever is lower 677 . The trouble with this
method, which Sumitomo and other Japanese firms that
suffered losses are believed to have used, is that it does
not reflect real losses until the company disposes of the
assets in question 678 . A third method, sometimes used in
accounting for derivatives, is hedge accounting. This
method can be used for contracts in which the derivative is
specifically entered into to protect the price of another
asset, which is either held or anticipated for purchase or
sale 679 . All profits from the contract are simply recognized
as being part of the purchase or sale price of the
underlying hedged asset 680 .
- Banks should monitor credit exposures, market risk
exposures, trading positions, and market movements at least
daily. Banks should calculate market risk exposures at
least daily using a measure such as value-at-risk 681 . Value-
at-risk measures potential gain or loss in a position,
portfolio, or institution that is associated with a price
movement of a given probability over a specified time
horizon682 . Stress tests should be quantitative analyses,
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such as contingency plans 683 . Analyses of stress situations
should assess not only the probability of adverse events,
but also address plausible "worst case" scenarios on an
institution-wide basis, which consider the effect of
unusual price changes or default of a large counterparty
across both derivatives and cash trading portfolios. What
is the purpose of the stress test? A stress test should
demonstrate to a bank where it may have too much exposure
in a particular risk dimension or, with respect to a
particular counterparty, where it may be relying on assumed
relationships between prices, volatility, or liquidity
conditions that could break down 684 . The stress test should
help the bank identify genuine potential threats and how
banks might manage themselves in these scenarios.
Furthermore, a system of integrated, institution-wide
limits and risk-taking guidelines should set boundaries for
risk-taking activities and ensure that positions that
exceed predetermined levels receive prompt management
action 685 . So, there should be global limits for each types
of risks. Banks with significant trading and derivative
activities should internally review methods of risk
measurement at least annually686 . Before a new product is
traded, senior management, risk management, internal
control, legal accounting, auditing, and traders should
understand it, develop appropriate policies and controls,
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and integrate the product into risk measurement and control
systems 687 . More recently, regarding capital requirements,
the Federal Reserve announced a new approach , the so-
called "pre-commitment approach", which means that each
bank would state the maximum loss that its trading book
will sustain over, say, the next three months 688 . So the
bank, in effect, pre-commits to a maximum loss level. Their
capital charge for market risk equals the pre-committed
maximum loss level and if the bank' s losses exceed this
level, a significant penalty is imposed689 . While pre-
commitment has received mixed reviews from the banking
industry it carries three advantages. First, it means that
banks can choose to control risk through higher capital
levels or by use of sophisticated dynamic hedging
strategies 690 . Second, pre-commitment also gives banks an
incentive to use the most sophisticated methods for
assessing portfolio risk and improve their risk assessment
technologies 691 . Finally, the approach saves regulators from
imposing some type of basic, one-size-fits-all model of
portfolio risk on their clients for setting regulatory
capital 692 . Instead, they need only to verify that the
bank' s risk management structure is in place and is
adequate. It is also less burdensome and intrusive on banks
than other options.
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2. Nontradina Activities Examiner Guidelines
a. Provisions on Board of Directors and Senior
Management Oversight
The Nontrading Activities Examiner Guidelines also
call for active oversight of end-user derivative activities
by the board of directors and senior management of banks 693 .
In general, the familiarity, technical knowledge, and
awareness of directors and senior management should be
commensurate with the level and nature of the bank'
s
derivative positions 694 . Senior management should ensure
that there are adequate policies and procedures for
conducting nontrading derivative activities on a long-range
and day-to-day basis. These policies and procedures include
clear lines of authority and responsibility for acquiring
instruments and managing risk, appropriate limits on risk-
taking, adequate systems for measuring risk, acceptance
standards for valuing positions and measuring performance,
effective internal controls, and a comprehensive risk
reporting and management review process 695 .
b. Provisions on Written Policies and Procedures
Written policies and procedures should clearly outline
the bank's approach to management of end-user derivative
activities. Such policies should be consistent with the
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bank's broader business strategies, capital adequacy,
technical expertise, and risk appetite 696 .
c. Provisions on Risk Measurement
Regardless of any responsability, legal or otherwise,
assumed by the dealer, a bank acting as end-user ultimately
is responsible for understanding and managing risks posed
by its derivative transactions 697 .
3. Risk Management Examiner Guidelines
In November 1995, the Federal Reserve issued the "Risk
Management Examiner Guidelines'". The risk management
examiner guidelines are intended to assist examiners in
their evaluation of risk management controls. Examiners are
to give them considerable weight in their overall
evaluation of an institution's management 698 . The management
rating will be an important factor in determining an
institution's CAMEL supervisory rating699 . The main
principles resulting from these guidelines are the
following700 :
- the board of directors is responsible for the level
of risk taken by the bank and it should approve all
strategies for risk taking activities;
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- the board of directors and senior management must
identify and measure all material risk exposures and tailor
risk management policies and procedures to the risks taken;
- the safe and sound functioning of the institution
must be established and maintained by internals controls
and separation of duties.
b. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
A new Banking Circular701 called "Risk Management of
Financial Derivatives" or Bank Circurlar 277 from October
1993 provides guidance to national banks, and Federally
licensed branches and agencies of foreign banks that engage
in derivative activities. These provisions focus
principally on OTC derivatives but are for the most part
substantively similar to those issued by the Federal
Reserve. They emphasizes on the use of derivatives as an
appropriate risk management tool. Circular 277 offers
specific guidance on market, credit, liquidity, operations,
and system risk management and measurement. The OCC
believes that the best defense against sizeable individual
losses or significant systemic disruptions is the
implementation and use by individual banks of sound and
efficient risk management processes 702 . With respect to risk
measurement, Circular 277 provides that a bank active in
derivative transactions should have a system to determine
153
potential credit risk703 . According to the Circular, a bank
may engage in the hedging of physical commodity derivatives
with physical commodities only under the following
conditions 704 :
- the commodities transactions supplement and
constitute a nominal percentage of the bank's risk
management activities;
- the commodities transactions are used to hedge
otherwise permissible, customer-driven banking activities;
- the commodities transactions are not entered into
for speculative purposes and prior to entering into
commodities transactions, the bank's board of directors and
the OCC should have approved a detailed plan for the
hedging activity. However, derivative transactions with
respect to bank-eligible precious metals (gold, silver and
platinum ) are not subject to this latest provision705 . The
OCC did not adopt a suitability standard for bank
derivative activities in its circular. The suitability
guidelines in Circular 277 generally do not apply to a
bank' s transaction with other dealers or sophisticated
market participants, nor do they require banks to request
specific information or make a judgment about suitability
before recommending a transaction706 . Circular 277 presumes,
consistent with safe and sound banking practices, that a
bank dealer will not recommend transactions it knows, or
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has reason to know, would be inappropriate for the customer
on the basis of available information. Although a bank
would not be prohibited from executing a transaction it
believes to be inappropriate for a customer, it must advise
the customer of this determination, document it, and
consider the customer's ability to perform the contract in
making a credit decision707 . The OCC also issued a circular
on May 10, 1994 that further described responsibilities of
banks engaged in derivative transactions 708 . This circular
was designed to answer questions raised by the prior
circular on this subject 709 . Of particular concern to banks
was the scope of the requirement for determining the
appropriateness of derivatives for bank customers 710 .
Further, the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency has proposed
many ways to strengthen the way national banks manage their
derivative risks. One proposal is to have a unit,
independent of the traders, that carefully monitors the
trader's investments. The Comptroller acknowledges that the
internal systems used by the biggest banks are more
sophisticated than those it is considering711 . On September
26, 1995 in News Release, the OCC announced plans to
implement a revised system under which its examiners will
evaluate risk in national banks 712 .
Under the new system, called "supervision by risk,
"
the OCC examiners will use newly defined, specific
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categories of risk to assess risk exposure 713 . The goal of
the supervision by risk is to evaluate the quantity of risk
exposure and determine the quality of risk management
systems in place to control that risk. The OCC will use
risk as an organizing principle for all safety and
soundness supervision714 . Supervision by risk reflects a
judgment by the OCC that risk assessment must be more fully
and evenly incorporated into bank supervision. Therefore,
the identified nine risks will be treated the same
throughout all national banks, all products, and all
activities. The nine identified risks are: (1) credit risk;
(2) interest rate risk; (3) liquidity risk; (4) price
risk; (5) foreign exchange risk; (6) transaction risk (7)
compliance risk; (8) strategic risk; and (9) reputation
risk. Under supervision by risk, examiners will make and
record judgments of risk exposure and the ability of the
particular national bank to manage that risk exposure 715 .
Examiners will then, prepare a summary that measures the
national bank's aggregate risk judgment and determines the
areas of potential future risk716 . Examinations will no
longer be focused by a transactional approach or an
approach based upon product line. The OCC has already
implemented part of the proposed supervision by risk717 .
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c. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
The goal of the FDIC guidelines is to ensure that
appropriate capital levels, expertise and management
controls are maintained by insured banks engaging in
derivatives 718 . These guidelines focus on the examination of
institutions that are end-users of derivatives 719 .
FDIC reviews mainly the risks associated with derivatives.
The Guidelines state for example, that banks are
responsible for fully understanding a transaction's
derivative instrument and the associated risks 720 . A end-
user bank has the duty to determine the suitability and
appropriateness of its involvement with an activity. The
guidelines also highlight that examiners should identify
and review in detail institutions that appear to be
speculating by taking unhedged or unmatched positions in
anticipation that future price movements will be
advantageous.
3. State Agencies
No state appears to have enacted express statutory
authority permitting a State Bank to engage in financial
derivative transactions to the same extent as National
Banks 721 . The Kansas Attorney General, for example, has
opined that a Kansas State Bank does not have the power to
enter into financial derivative transactions 722 . At least
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two states expressly authorize derivative activities to
some extent 723 . The bank regulatory authority for New York
has authorized several different types of derivative
activities 724 . Illinois appears to have recognized an
incidental power for its State Banks to hedge their
interest rate risk through the use of interest rate swaps
and similar instruments 725 . Failure to authorize the use of
financial derivatives for State Banks could deprive them of
an important tool for managing interest risk or of the
opportunity to generate additional revenue.
4. The Derivatives Policy Group' s : Framework for
Voluntary Oversight
Representatives of broker-dealers with affiliates that
are major OTC derivatives market participants, with the
cooperation of the SEC and CFTC, have joined under the
Derivatives Policy Group in an effort to define a voluntary
oversight framework for the OTC derivatives activities of
unregulated securities firm affiliates of SEC-registered
broker-dealers and CFTC-registered Futures Commission
merchants 726 . The purpose is to define the relationship
among participants in the OTC financial markets and to
articulate a set of sound practices to be followed in
connection with OTC financial market transactions among
participants 727 . The framework and principles articulate the
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basic assumption that in the OTC derivative markets,
participants transact business at arm's length basis. As
such, each particpant is itself responsible for
understanding the proposed derivative transaction and its
attendant risks and obtaining the additional information or
independent professional assistance required to do so 728 .
Further, it underscores that participants should act
honestly and in good faith in all dealings and should
always seek to clarify the precise nature of their
relationships with their counterparties in writing. The
Derivatives Policy Group's analytical framework consists of
four interrelated components 729 :
1. Management Controls. This component consists of the
implementation of internal management controls for
monitoring and measuring the various risks to which a firm
may be exposed as a result of dealings in OTC derivative
products, and the inclusion of an external audit and
verification process 730 . For example, regarding liquidity
risk, procedures should be in place to measure and provide
for potential funding requirements that might arise as a
result of the impact of market movements on cash flows and
collateral and margin requirements in light of mismatches
in the timing of offsetting payment and delivery
obligations 731 . These controls, many of which are already in
place, will be implemented individually by each firm and
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are designed to effectuate prudent risk management
practices.
2. Enhanced reporting. This component consists of the
periodic submission to the SEC and the CFTC of a series of
new quantitative reports covering credit risk exposures
arising from OTC derivative activities and related
information732 .
3. Evaluation of risk in relation to capital. This
component includes the development of a framework for
estimating market and credit risk exposures arising from
OTC derivative activities 733 .
4. Counterparty relationships. This element of the
framework embodies guidelines for professional
intermediaries with respect to their relationships with
nonprofessional counterparties in connection with OTC
derivatives
.
For these purposes, OTC derivative products include:
interest rate, currency, equity and commodity swaps, OTC
options and currency forwards 734 .
5. Bank for International Settlements ("BIS")
The G-10 central bank governors have been considering
a range of issues related to derivatives activities 735 . The
Committee on Banking Supervision and the International
Organization of Securities Commissions each issued in July,
160
1994, documents providing risk management guidelines for
derivatives to banks and securities firms and their
supervisors 736 . The guidelines stress the importance of
sound internal risk management by dealers and end-users of
derivative instruments with key elements including: (i)
oversight by boards of directors and senior management
through timely reporting under an independent risk
management function; (ii) a risk management process
involving prudent risk limits, sound measurement procedures
and information systems, and continuous risk monitoring and
reporting; and (iii) comprehensive internal controls and
audit procedures 737 . The guidelines also presents sound
practices for management of credit, market, liquidity,
operational, and legal risks involved in derivative
activities 738 . In December 1994, the Committee issued
another report, called "Prudential Supervision of Banks'
Derivative Activities." 739 This report provides an overview
of the 1988 Basle Capital Accord and other past and current
projects on the G-10 central banks that address derivative
activities. On December 11, 1995, the Governors of the G-10
central banks endorsed a proposal by the Committee to amend
the 1988 Basle Capital Accord to take into account market
risk740 . The capital standards which are to be implemented
fully by bank supervisors by the end of 1997, would apply
to market risks associated with foreign exchange,
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commodities, options, and trading activities of
internationally active banks. Banks would have to meet
certain quantitative standards to ensure measures of market
risk are sufficiently robust and consistent across
institutions, as well as qualitative standards for their
risk management systems, such as an independent risk
control unit with active involvement of senior management
in risk management 741 .
C. REGULATION BY THE REGULATORS
1. Introduction
Organized exchanges where derivatives can be traded,
establish rules and procedures that apply to all members as
well as to individuals and firms participating in option
transactions 742 . Rule violations may be punishable by fines
and/or suspensions 743 . The Options Clearing Corporation also
regulates its members to help ensure that all activities in
the option markets are proper and do not pose a risk to the
market's viability744 .
2. Margin Rules Applied by Futures and Options
Exchanges
As noted earlier, key tools to affect trading and
reduce risk are the margin rules and marking-to-market
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method. Futures and Options exchanges, supervised by their
regulators, usually set margin rules for their brokers'
transactions with them or with their clearinghouse and for
the brokers' customers 745 .
- Margin Rules for Customers' Futures Contracts
For customer's futures contracts, long and short positions
are subject to margin rules in the United States. At the
time of the purchase, a customer buying a position pays an
initial margin that is a share of today' s cash future
price 746 . The amount is usually a small percentage and it
varies depending upon whether the position is a hedge or
speculative and on the contract's variability747 . The
customer may give cash or securities. The maintenance
margin is set daily against the current market value of the
contract, which is marked-to-market daily748 . Any loss in
value is deducted entirely from the margin account and any
gain is added. This is called the variation749 . The broker
passes the variation to the exchange, which in turn passes
it to the broker on the other side of such a transaction,
for the customer. So any shift raises one margin account
and lowers the other. Whenever a customer's margin account
falls below the minimum maintenance level, the broker makes
a margin call and the customer must return the margin
deposit to its initial level 750 .
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- Margin Rules for Brokers' Futures Contracts
A member broker (or clearing member) has many customer
accounts as well as its own proprietary accounts. Futures
exchange clearinghouses set margins for member broker'
s
futures contracts 751 . The clearinghouse usually calculates
gains or losses on each broker's total long positions and
on its total short positions in each contract at the end of
the trading day752 . Some net the sums, offsetting gains in
short or long against losses in long or short 753 . The
clearinghouse then, adjusts the broker's clearing margin
account for each contract by the gain or loss and the
broker tops up or withdraws funds as appropriate 754 .
To mitigate systemic risk, it would be a good policy to
calculate positions and margin requirements not by the end
of the day but make also at least one intra-day assessment.
- Margin Rules for Options
When calls and puts are purchased, the option price must be
paid in full. Investors are not allowed to buy options on
margin. This is because options already contain substantial
leverage 755 . Buying on margin would raise this leverage to
an unacceptable level 756 . When an investor writes an option,
he or she is required to maintain funds in a margin
account. This is because the investor's broker and the
exchange want to be satisfied that the investor will not
default if the option is exercised757 . Regulation T of the
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Federal Reserve Act authorizes the Federal Reserve to
regulate the extension of credit in the United States 758 .
This authority extends to the regulation of margin credit
on transactions in stocks and options 759 .
3. The National Futures Association (NFA)
Created in 1982, the National Futures Association is
an organization of individuals and firms that participate
in the futures industry760 . The NFA is a self-regulatory
agency which objective is to prevent fraud and manipulation
as well as to protect the public interest 761 . The NFA
requires registration of its members who must meet strict
requirements and pass an examination762 . No NFA member may
accept a transaction from anyone other than an NFA
member 763 . Like the CFTC, the NFA monitors trading and
identify rule violations as well as impose disciplinary
action764 . Thus, it relieves the CFTC of some of this
responsability and turns the regulatory authority over to
the market participants themselves. The National Futures
Association ("NFA") , the industry's largest self-regulatory
body, has adopted a "know your customer" rule 765 , which
requires members to obtain specified information from
customers, including income, net worth, and prior
investment and futures trading experience, prior to opening
an account.
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4. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
The CFTC is given exclusive jurisdiction over
transactions in commodity futures contracts and commodity
options, which generally must be traded on a board of trade
or exchange and are subject to the requirements of the
CFTC766 . The Commodity Exchange Act 767 ("CEA")
,
provides that
all transactions in commodity futures contracts and
commodity options, with certain exceptions, must occur on
or be subject to the rules of contract markets subject to
the supervision of the CFTC768 . The Commodity Futures
Trading Commission is responsible for licensing futures
exchanges and contracts 769 . The CFTC also approves all terms
and conditions of each proposed contract as well as
modifications of the terms of existing contracts 770 . To be
approved by this agency, a contract must have an economic
purpose, i.e that it can be used for hedging, and not be
contrary to the "public interest" 771 . The CFTC is
responsible for ensuring that the exchanges make price
information available to the public and establishes
position limits, the maximum number of contracts a trader
can have at any one time772 . The CFTC has the authority to
require exchanges to establish and enforce disciplinary
actions against members found to be in violation of the
exchange's rules 773 . One of the CFTC s primary
responsibilities is market surveillance 774 . Federal law
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makes it a felony to attempt to manipulate the futures
market775 . The CFTC monitors trading for indications of
possible manipulation776 . In 1986, Congress passed the
Futures Trading Act, which reauthorized the CFTC for three
more years and extended the agency' s powers to include
regulation of any futures transaction, whether conducted on
or off an exchange 777 . In 1992, a new reauthorization bill
granted the Federal Reserve Board the authority to oversee
the setting of margin requirements on stock index
futures 778 . However, the CFTC has always been a reluctant
regulator and for the most part, its views are that the
markets should regulate themselves 779 . That argument is not
without a great deal of substance, but that position
exposes the financial system to a great deal of uncertainty
that has not generally been tolerated for other financial
instruments 780 . Like the SEC, the CFTC has not established a
suitability rule for CFTC-regulated instruments 781 . The
Commodity Exchange Act has anti-fraud provisions applicable
to the purchase or sale of futures contracts by futures
commission merchants and their associates as well as to
commodity trading advisors and their associates 782 . The CFTC
also adopted an anti-fraud rule for commodity options
transactions 783 . However, the CFTC has determined that a
futures commission merchant w does not violate Section 4b
of the Commodity Exchange Act, merely because he fails to
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determine whether a customer is suitable for commodity
trading" 784 . As is the case with broker-dealers, a futures
commission merchant's misrepresentation of an unsuitable
investment is civilly actionable under the Commodity
Exchange Act if it constitutes fraud785 . While the CFTC has
decided that futures commission merchants have the
fiduciary duty to make full disclosures of material
facts 786 , ultimately , the responsibility to judge the
suitability of investments apparently is on the informed
customer, given the CFTC's emphasis on risk disclosure 787 .
The CFTC requires the futures commission merchants and
CFTC-regulated firms to provide risk disclosure statements
prior to opening customer accounts 788 . Required disclosures
direct the customer to the issue of suitability, often by
instructing the customer to determine whether the
transaction at issue is suitable for the customer 789 .
5. The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)
The SEC has responsibility for oversight of most
options markets, and it performs many of the functions the
CFTC performs with futures markets 790 .
6. The Gene ral Accounting Office (GAP)
The rapid growth in the use of derivatives by
corporations has caught the accounting profession by
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surprise 791 . Derivative transactions had previously been
viewed as off-balance sheet activities 792 that were only
mentioned in footnotes to the financial statements of firms
dealing in derivatives 793 . As noted previously, the footnote
provided very little data as to the amount of risk or
profits and losses from those instruments. It was at the
urging of the SEC that firms engaging in derivative
transactions have disclosed their profits and losses from
that activity794 . The GAO made recommendations to Congress,
the Federal bank supervisory agencies and the SEC to
strengthen the regulation and supervision of derivative
activities 795 . The GAO report identifies boards of directors
and senior management of institutions that participate in
the derivatives market as primarily responsible for risk
management 796 . The GAO report recommends that Congress
require federal regulation of the safety and soundness of
the fifteen major United States OTC derivative dealers. It
also recommends that Federal supervisors and regulators
develop initiatives with industry representatives and
regulators from other countries to harmonize disclosure,
capital, legal examination, and accounting standards for
derivatives. The GAO report concluded that gaps in
regulation threatened the integrity of the financial
markets and suggested that the sudden failure of a major
dealer in over-the-counter derivatives might cause market
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liquidity problems which, in turn, would threaten federally
insured banks and the financial system as a whole 797 . Such a
failure, the report stated, might require government
intervention and even a taxpayer bailout 798 . The report
urged Congress to regulate currently unregulated activities
of securities firms and insurance companies 799 . The report
noted that the gaps in regulation pertained mostly to
securities firms and insurance companies and not banks 800 .
Nevertheless, House banking Committee Chairman Henry
Gonzalez and Representative Jim Leach introduced a bill
that would require banks to disclose more information about
their derivative activities 801 .
CHAPTER IX:
FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES
A. CONGRESS' INITIATIVES - CONGRESSIONAL REGULATION
While the regulatory community is struggling to foster
the development of adequate risk-control tools, Congress is
nervously watching events like the Bankers Trust
litigation, Orange County and the precipitous collapse of
Barings PLC and considering whether more rigid controls are
necessary. Banking regulators have been attempting to
regulate derivative activities and have asked Congress not
to interfere 802 . But some members of Congress continue to
feel that additional legislation is necessary803 . A series
of bills brought up during the 103rd congressional session
is indicative of Congress' concern over the state of the
industry and the magnitude of losses market participants
have recently sustained804 . Some members of the Congress
believe that congressional action is necessary to bring
about uniform and detailed disclosure by banks of
derivative product activities 805 . Disclosure requirements
would allow banking regulators to discern both the risks to
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the banking system as a whole and to individual
institutions 806 . Congress is also contemplating additional
regulation807 . In the House of Representatives, 3 bills on
derivatives have been introduced.
1.- House Banking Committee Chairman Leach introduced
the "Risk Management Improvement and Derivatives Oversight
Act of 1995" the so-called Leach Bill. Leach proposes to
set up a new Commission the FDC - Federal Derivatives
Commission - comprised of the various banking regulators
and new derivatives self-regulatory organizations
(SRO's) 808 .
The members of the FDC would be: the Chairman of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; the
Comptroller of the Currency; the Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; the
Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision; the Chairman
of the Securities and Exchange Commission; the Chairman of
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission; and the Secretary
of the Treasury809 . The FDC would be required to establish
uniform regulations regarding derivative activities by
banks 810 . The FDC would have the authority to establish
principles and standards related to capital, accounting,
disclosure and suitability811 . Each regulatory agency would
then adopt implementing regulations. Under Representative
Leach' s plan, the FDC would have discretion to establish
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specific disclosure requirements 812 and would be expected to
make recommendations to protect against systemic risk813 .
The FDC would be responsible for setting standards
relating to: (1) the amount of capital a bank must hold
before engaging in derivative activity; (2) the amount of
disclosure a bank must make regarding derivative activity;
and (3) any appropriate regulatory action needed for
adequate supervision of banks engaged in derivative
activity814 . The FDC is also required to establish uniform
reporting systems for federal and state regulators 815 .
Further, the FDC must sponsor training programs for bank
examiners to improve their ability to identify and assess
risks posed by derivative activities 816 . Uniform disclosure
and training rules would create greater coordination and
cooperation among the regulators and would ensure that
derivative activities of institutions subject to different
regulators are regulated similarly817 . The bill also
requires banks to disclose the amount, nature, and terms of
the derivatives that they hold818 . Banks must disclose: (1)
the gross fair market value of any holdings they had in
derivatives; (2) the revenue gains and losses from
derivatives; (3) net credit exposure under a bilateral
netting contract; and (4) remaining terms of maturity of
any derivative held by a bank 819 . The purpose of these
disclosure requirements is to allow regulators to better
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understand the derivative activities of the bank and the
risks involved820 . The bill also calls for the banking
regulators to develop "emergency reporting" methods to be
used in the case of banking emergencies such as adverse
market conditions 621 . Under this provision, regulators could
obtain any information from banks deemed "necessary" to
address the emergency822 . The bill grants banking regulators
greater enforcement powers because a failure to comply with
the statute would be considered an unsafe and unsound
practice and the regulators could assess civil penalties 823 .
Finally, the bill attempts to assure that banks
dealing in derivatives are skilled in such dealings. The
bill bars banks from selling or buying derivatives unless a
sufficient number of directors are familiar with the risks
associated with the class of derivatives in which the bank
deals 824 .
2. - Representative Gonzalez introduced in January of
last year the "Derivatives Safety and Soundness Supervision
Act of 1995" which requires the Federal Bank supervision
and regulatory agencies to jointly establish principles and
standards relating to Capital, Accounting, Disclosure, Risk
Management and Suitability. Representative Gonzalez's bill
established disclosure requirements for banks engaged in
derivative activities instead of creating the FDC 825 .
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3.- Representative Markey introduced the "Derivatives
Dealers Act of 1995" which would amend the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to include derivatives based on the
value of a security within the definition of the security.
4.- Another Member of Congress suggested that stop-
trading orders, or "circuit breakers" should be used during
periods of turmoil or unusual turbulence in the derivatives
market 826 . Such a move would expand the use of circuit
breakers, which exchanges currently use to regulate the
large OTC market for derivatives.
5.- The Senate Bill: On July 18, 1994, Senate Banking
Committee Chairman, Donald Riegle, introduced a bill
entitled the Derivative Supervision Act of 1994 827 . This
bill forces banks to separate their derivatives activity
from other activities 828 . The bill requires banks to set up
separate holding company subsidiaries in order to buy and
sell derivatives for a bank's own account 829 . The bill
requires banks to set up a management plan stating their
purpose in holding derivatives and how the holding is
consistent with the overall management plan830 .
CHAPTER X:
CONCLUSION
Banks are stepping out of their traditional role as
deposit-takers and lenders, and are moving along the road
toward becoming complete financial intermediaries embracing
derivatives as either dealers or end-users. Fundamental
economic forces have led to financial innovations that have
increased competition in financial markets. Greater
competition in turn has diminished the cost advantage banks
have had in acquiring funds and has undercut their position
in loan markets. As a result, traditional banking has lost
profitability, and banks have begun to diversify into new
activities, such as derivatives, that bring higher returns.
Derivative financial instruments have revolutionalized
the financial industry, providing both dealers and end-
users with sophisticated risk-management capabilities and
other benefits as well. Along with the rapid expansion of
the derivatives market has come the potential for
substantial disruptions, not only among individual market
players but throughout the financial markets worldwide. The
primary sources of the risk include the sheer volume of the
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derivatives market, the interlinking of markets and market
participants, the lack of regulatory supervision in the OTC
market, and the concentration of derivatives activity among
a relatively small number of major dealers. Investors also
face serious risks arising primarily from a lack of
sophistication and inadequate disclosure by dealers.
Industry players and many regulators do not want additional
regulation. Conversely, members of Congress feel increased
regulation is essential to the protection of the financial
system and the U. S. taxpayer . All of us know that there is
no greater enemy of the marketplace than a loss of
confidence in the market mechanism itself. While the
perceptions of the risks and challenges may differ, the
objectives of supervisors, financial institutions and users
are the same, i.e, maintaining a strong financial system
over the long run. The challenge for regulators is to
encourage financial market innovation without compromising
the elements which are essential to sound and orderly
markets. But one should keep in mind that there is no such
a thing as "zero risk" and banking is not intended to be a
risk free activity. Some view derivative activities as
highly speculative endeavors that greatly jeopardize
financial safety and soundness. The focus is placed on the
potential for weak or ill-managed institutions to suffer
large losses through derivatives trading, thereby
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endangering the safety of both the banking system and the
fund that backs federally insured deposits. In this regard,
some have favored restricting, or even banning, derivative
activities at insured commercial banks. Over the last five
years, however, the banking industry and the regulators
have learned a great deal about the prudential regulation
of bank derivatives and have applied the lessons in their
practices. Banks have actually managed the risks associated
with derivatives almost better than the risks associated
with their basic lending activities. Financial institutions
have been known to fail due to losses from imprudent
lending activities. Recent failures involve losses due to
bad lending associated with real estate, the commercial
sector, third world nations, and the energy and agriculture
sectors. Furthermore, it is likely that derivatives have
become so enmeshed in modern life that it is almost
impossible to go back and remove them from the markets.
Derivatives are now an integral and still-growing part
of the global financial marketplace. Many believe they are
essential for enhancing global market liquidity and
managing market risk. Indeed, derivative markets allow the
transfer of risk from those wanting to remove or decrease
it to those willing to assume or increase it. They merely
allow risk to be passed from one investor to another.
Derivative markets neither generate nor dismantle wealth
,
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they merely relocate it. The benefits of derivatives,
however, extend far beyond the market participants. The new
derivatives and financial products that exchanges
introduce, often make valuable and durable contributions to
the development of our capital markets which, in turn,
promote economic welfare. Derivatives help financial
markets become more efficient and provide better
opportunities for managing risks. These benefits spill over
into society as a whole. The apologists who argue that "it
is not derivatives that are the problem, it is how they are
used" are technically correct, just like America's pro-gun
lobby with its slogan "guns don't kill people, people do."
On balance, the overall impact of derivatives on economic
activity has been positive and is likely to remain so.
Besides, the attention directed at derivatives in the
past few years has had a salutary influence on the entire
market over time because it helped increase understanding
among the purchasers of derivative products of their risks.
The investment banks, accountants, big corporate users,
financial experts and economists and others who earn their
crust by working with derivatives will argue that mis-
selling is so rare. Indeed, disasters have typically been
caused by fraud, or by a derivative being misused or
misunderstood, not by its failure to do what it was
supposed to do. Moreover, in some of the best known
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fiascos, such as Barings PLC, derivatives actually played a
relatively small role, yet (in the popular press, at least)
got much of the blame. Likewise, until today no empirical
study has proved that derivatives increase volatility and
some have concluded that derivatives may even reduce it.
The impact could vary according to whether they are
used mainly to hedge risks or to speculate on markets.
Thus, conclusive evidence that derivatives destabilise
markets is yet to be shown. So far, most of the debate
about derivatives has concentrated on the banking industry
because that is where they have been most heavily used and
because regulators fear that a disaster in a bank might
have knock-on effects throughout the financial system. The
different incidents due to derivative trades illustrate
today, more than ever before, that it is critical that a
financial institution' s internal safety net - its risk
management and internal control systems - keeps pace with
the risks presented by this dynamic financial environment,
regardless of the institution's size. To keep pace with the
risks associated with the use of derivatives, several goals
should be embraced by every financial institution trading
derivatives. First, the development of a fully independent
risk management staff and a strong internal control
environment. It is essential that skilled people and
personnel with high integrity, are hired not only for the
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trading floors and risk management staffs, but also for
back offices and internal audit functions. Indeed, when
considering the importance of complex derivatives, there is
another kind of risk involved: intellectual risk, which
leads to the question: how well educated regarding
derivatives are personnel, from the trader on the desk up
to the Board of Directors? Banks should also keep in mind
that risk management is a corporate management issue: the
board of directors is responsible for knowing in what the
institution is involved and for understanding the attendant
risks. Since regulatory agencies and their supervisors must
be in a position to assess the most sophisticated internal
sensitivity models used by banks to simulate changes in
their net worth arising from possible future changes in
asset prices, they must be able to fully understand the
complicated and technical systems used by the regulated
banks. In that regard, would any effort at regulation not
be hampered by the difficulty of obtaining highly and
technically qualified people? Would it not be difficult -
if not impossible - for the regulatory agencies to attract
people with these scarce financial skills? Second, the
development and, in some cases, further enhancement of
measurement and monitoring techniques for all types of
risk, including market risk and credit risk resulting from
derivative activities. An information system that is
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sophisticated is essential to risk management and to
development of effective stress testing and contingency
planning capabilities. Banks trading derivatives should be
equipped with elaborate analysis computer programs that
measure the potential risk of one-day price move to a
specified level of probability. Upgrades in technology will
be needed in order to assure integration of computer
systems in a firm' s dealing with derivatives on a wide-
scale basis. Additionally, banks trading derivatives should
set up special computer programs which would enable
personnel and management staff to educate and train
themselves against a financial apocalyptic scenario. Like
in the aviation industry, there is no room for error in the
huge derivatives industry. Third, and even more
fundamental, is the critical assessment by the board of
directors and senior management of an institution's
tolerance for risk, ensuring that risk management and
internal control systems are commensurate with that level
of risk. Fourth, it is self-evident that a full
appreciation of risk cannot be developed without accurate
information. Thus, there is little question in my mind
about the urgency of achieving dramatic progress in the
areas of financial disclosure and market transparency. A
striking aspect of the markets these last years has been
the periodic episodes of tremendous uncertainty as to the
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exact nature of market forces at work and the size of
overhanging positions. This uncertainty provided a fertile
ground for rumors about forced liquidation of financial
groups and the financial health of individual firms, and
created the potential for volatile and disorderly markets.
Sixth, netting is a powerful tool for market makers.
Legally binding netting of payments enables market makers
to reduce significantly the enormous sums that are at risk
on any given day. Seventh, the derivatives business is
international. While American companies have been
maintaining leadership in the industry through constant
innovation, the ease with which the industry could move
off-shore limits Congress and regulators' room to maneuver.
Therefore, resolution of concerns should be achieved only
through a high level of international cooperation and
agreement. More work should be done at the G-10 central
banks. Eighth, derivative activities could be conducted by
separate subsidiaries. In the past, similar concerns than
those experienced in the derivatives market caused the
industry and the regulators to recommend that
nontraditional banking activities, such as those associated
with underwriting and dealing in corporate debt and equity
securities, be conducted only by well-managed and well-
capitalized banks in separate subsidiaries of the bank
holding company. Ninth, consolidation supervision need to
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be inplemented. We know that derivatives are not subject to
consolidated supervision and regulation. Because they take
place in a variety of exchange and OTC market environments,
the concerns over the potential risks associated with these
markets has been tempered by the recognition that any
attempt to regulate these markets in a consolidated fashion
may interfere with their efficient functioning and deprive
participants of their important risk-management benefits.
But what is the point of periodic bank examinations and
reporting requirements when the risk characteristics of a
bank's proprietary trading position can be transformed
almost instantaneously through the use of derivative
products? Should banks not be required to report their
overall positions at least daily so that supervisors can
keep track of what is going on? The answer given by the
industry is that such an approach would place an impossible
burden on all concerned while generating more data than
anyone would know what to do with. Tenth, additional
regulation and guidelines do not seem to be necessary. The
existing regulatory framework addresses the issues and
provides adequate solutions, at least for exchange traded
derivatives. It ensures that banks manage the risks posed
by the use of derivatives so that they will be used safely
and soundly. Key components of risk management are an
independent risk management system, a strong internal
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control environment, and an integrated, institution-wide
system for measuring and limiting risk. This means
sufficient separation of duties, complete separation of
front-office (trading) and back-office operations, a daily
reevaluation of trading positions independent of trading
personnel and management, and an independent validation
process for each step of the risk management process. Too
much regulation will not be an appropriate answer because
derivatives should stay innovative. Additional regulatory
legislation could move the industry offshore, and out of
the reach of U.S. regulatory jurisdiction and any bill that
imposes further restrictions on banks will send investors
to derivatives created by securities firms or other
financial businesses whose activities are less well
regulated than those of banks. Moreover, any effort to
restrict the ability of banks to engage in derivative
transactions would increase costs and burdens to the
industry and the communities served by these institutions.
The middle-ground between no action and heavy-handed
legislation would be more relevant and may direct us to
take action by only placing the relatively unsupervised OTC
dealers under the power of some existing regulatory agency,
and implementing set standards with respect to accounting
procedures, capital reserves, and corporate oversight
within the OTC industry. The Federal Reserve, the OCC and
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the FDIC guidelines require banks and other users to
establish written derivative policies and identify
associated fundamental risks. For banking supervisors,
probably the most important issue they face concerning
financial derivatives is what could go wrong to engender
systemic risk, the danger that disruptions or difficulties
at one institution could have a significant impact on other
financial institutions and through them on the overall
economy. The guidance appears to address the key safety and
soundness objectives of the Congress' concerns. On the
other hand, the over-the-counter market, being unregulated,
has shown a tremendous propensity to innovate by developing
new types of contracts such as swaps. Many would argue, and
I do, that this market should be regulated. Investments in
the OTC products should be controlled by the investment
management firms themselves who are directly accountable to
the marketplace and to investors. In this market, the role
of regulation is to ensure that investment companies
accurately and completely disclose both their objectives
and the types of investments they contemplate. It is the
role of the government to ensure that these companies
provide investors with a full and fair disclosure upon
which to base informed investment decisions. Despite the
rapid growth of derivatives and the great risks that may
accompany their use, banking regulators have not moved to
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prohibit or greatly restrict the use of derivatives. This
is not surprising. After all, are the risks posed by
derivatives so fundamentally different from those posed by
other investments that a radical and different regulatory
approach is necessary? Lawmakers' concerns over banks'
activity in financial derivatives stems from the potential
to speculate in the derivatives market, which allows banks
to bet with federally insured deposits and, ultimately,
with taxpayers' funds. Although financial derivatives are
fairly new, their risks are not. They reflect essentially
the same basic risks that banks have always been facing.
Some derivative contracts are quite complex but a complex,
difficult to manage, option is embedded in every fixed-rate
home mortgage. Although some derivative instruments are
undoubtedly complex, exposure to derivatives risk does not
seem much different from exposure to many other bank
activities, such as credit risk in a loan portfolio or
interest rate risk in a variety of fixed-income securities.
Banks can also achieve high leverage in a number of ways
other than through derivatives and can quickly change (or
increase) their risk exposure in many different ways.
Banks' recent push into derivative activities raises all of
the questions commonly raised when banks engage in new off-
balance-sheet activities. Instead of regulating bank's use
of derivatives, banking regulators have chosen to amend
187
their capital adequacy standards to account for the risks
posed by derivatives. Requiring banks to hold adequate
capital promotes financial stability in two ways. First, it
provides a greater cushion with which banks can absorb
losses, lessening the likelihood of failure. Second, with
more capital at risk, banks have less incentive to take
excessive risk because they will have more to loose if
their bets go wrong. /Another benefit is that regulation
need no longer restrict bank's activities. As long as banks
must hold sufficient capital against whatever activities
they engage in, taxpayers will be protected and banks will
have an incentive to avoid excessive risk taking. Further,
freedom to offer additional products and services will
better enable banks to compete with nonbank competitors and
with foreign banks. Another important component of a
regulatory strategy to maintain bank soundness is
supervisory monitoring. Regulation must be able to keep
banks from changing their risk exposure after capital
requirements are determined. As we have learned from the
Barings' collapse, regulators must also ensure that
adequate internal controls are in place with regard to
asset quality and risk management procedures. Finally,
public disclosure of bank' s risk exposures would increase
market efficiency and bolster market discipline. Banks
should provide a meaningful depiction of the risks
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associated with their trading activities in off-balance-
sheet activities and of their ability to manage these
risks. More public information about the risks incurred by
banks will better enable stockholders, creditors and
depositors to evaluate and monitor banks, and will act as a
deterrent to excessive risk taking. The regulation of banks
is and remains essential, because they have deposit
insurance and direct access to the Federal Reserve's
discount window. At the same time, however, this
combination of deposit insurance and access to the Federal
Reserve' s discount window also can result in potential
problems because it may incite the banks and their
customers to inappropriately rely on such backing.
Therefore, banks may be willing to run greater risks in
their trading activities - in relation to their capital -
than otherwise would be the case. In addition, market
participants may prefer using banks for derivatives and
related trading activities simply because banks are
perceived to be safer counterparties. The current deposit
guarantee structure does reduce the probability of large-
scale bank panics but has also created new issues. Deposit
insurance effectively eliminates the discipline provided by
the market mechanism in encouraging banks to maintain
appropriate capital levels and restrict unnecessary risk-
taking. Because of the federal deposit guarantee, some
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government lawmakers now propose to restrict insured banks'
activities in financial derivative markets. Without federal
deposit guarantees, banks' activities would be disciplined
by depositors and the bank would take only calculated risks
because uninsured depositors, concerned about the safety of
their deposits, would provide the discipline necessary to
guide financial institutions in maintaining adequate
capital and limiting risk strategies. Further, the presence
of deposit guarantees may encourage banks to use
derivatives to pursue higher risk strategies, such as
speculating on the direction of interest rates or exchange
differentials, instead of using derivatives for hedging to
improve their management of financial risks.
So, does the use of derivatives pose a serious threat to
the safety and soundness of the U.S. banking system?
I modestly do not view banks' derivatives activities
as a threat to financial stability. Properly used and
regulated, derivatives can facilitate the management of
risk and increase the long-term viability of banks and the
financial system. On the other hand, the relative newness
of this market, the fragmented regulatory responsibility,
the global trading and the competitive secrecy of many
transaction virtually precludes the possibility of getting
a full picture of the derivative markets. But are these
really central issues? Would it not be more to the point to
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address the fundamental issue of whether banking groups
should be allowed to operate high-risk, purely speculative
non banking business at all? I believe that the primary
task of banks is to act as facilitators of the money
transactions on which personal, industrial, commercial and
governmental activities are based. Should the bank only be
the totally safe and reliable repository of our savings?
Have banks strayed too far from their primary task? Perhaps
the time has come to initiate a fundamental study of the
current structure of the banking and financial service
industries. For some time, it seems to have become
fashionable to diversify into everything everywhere.
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